Daniel Latino and Robert Slawinski v. Edward Kaizer and City of Chicago
58 F.3d 310 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
A federal trial judge may not grant a new trial by vacating a jury's verdict as being against the weight of the evidence merely because the judge disbelieved a witness's testimony, unless that testimony contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws, as the Seventh Amendment grants substantial deference to the jury's role in assessing credibility.
Facts:
- Daniel Latino received four tickets for a Bulls-Lakers game from his boss, Mickey Monus, with instructions to give two extra tickets to industry buyers.
- Latino and Robert Slawinski drove to the Chicago Stadium on June 2, 1991, arriving around 1:00 p.m., intending to find industry contacts for the extra tickets.
- As they walked toward the stadium, Latino spotted an acquaintance, Richard Scrima, in a parking lot on the south side of Madison Street and approached him.
- Latino informed Scrima that he had extra tickets and asked if Scrima had seen anyone from the industry or had suggestions for what to do with them; Scrima offered to buy them, but Latino refused.
- Officer Edward Kaizer then tapped Latino on the shoulder, announced he was a police officer, and arrested Latino for ticket speculation, cuffing his right wrist.
- A second plainclothes officer then cuffed Slawinski's left wrist to Latino's right wrist after Slawinski confirmed he knew Latino.
- Officer Kaizer asked Latino for identification, and Latino stated it was in his car; Kaizer then asked how many tickets Latino had, and Latino replied four, but Kaizer did not immediately request the tickets.
- Latino and Slawinski were subsequently led to a parking lot, turned over to another officer, and later transported to the police station for processing.
Procedural Posture:
- Daniel Latino and Robert Slawinski sued Officer Edward Kaizer, Officer William Gordon, and the City of Chicago in a federal district court for false imprisonment and violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The first civil jury trial found in favor of the defendants.
- Latino and Slawinski filed post-trial motions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59, requesting a new trial.
- The district court judge denied the Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law, but granted the Rule 59 motion, vacating the first jury's verdict and ordering a new trial, finding the police officers' testimony to be perjury and the verdict against the weight of the remaining evidence.
- The second jury trial resulted in a verdict awarding Latino and Slawinski $5500.00 each against Officer Kaizer and the City of Chicago.
- The district court judge then awarded Latino and Slawinski $120,113.50 in attorney fees and $1,019.34 in expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
- Officer Edward Kaizer and the City of Chicago (defendants-appellants) appealed the jury award and attorney fees.
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Issue:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by vacating a jury's verdict and granting a new trial based on its determination that the police officers' testimony was perjurious and inherently improbable, rather than objectively impossible, thereby substituting its judgment for the jury's assessment of witness credibility?
Opinions:
Majority - Sharp, Chief District Judge
No, the district court abused its discretion in vacating the first jury's verdict and granting a new trial. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that a trial judge’s power to set aside a jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence is limited and requires a showing of a miscarriage of justice or a verdict that 'cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience.' While acknowledging the district court's deference in ordering new trials, the appellate court applied a more rigorous review because the new trial was granted based on the weight of the evidence in a case with simple, highly disputed facts, where greater deference is generally afforded to the jury's verdict. The court found that the district judge overstepped his authority by concluding that the officers' testimony was perjury simply because it was 'objectively and inherently improbable' or 'at war with common sense' to him. Testimony can only be effectively 'taken away' from the jury if it contradicts 'indisputable physical facts or laws,' which the officers' account (e.g., selling all four tickets for profit, mismatched tickets, retrieving wallets while cuffed) did not. These scenarios, though perhaps improbable to the judge, were within the realm of reasonable human behavior and jury understanding. The court concluded that this was a 'swearing contest' where witness credibility was 'peculiarly for the jury,' and the judge's actions invaded the jury's province, thus violating the spirit of the Seventh Amendment. Therefore, the district court's decision was an abuse of discretion.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the Seventh Amendment's protection of the right to a jury trial in civil cases by establishing a strict standard for judicial intervention with jury verdicts. It clarifies that a trial judge cannot simply substitute their own assessment of witness credibility or factual probability for that of the jury, even if the judge believes testimony is 'perjurious' or 'inherently improbable,' unless it defies objective physical impossibility. This ruling limits the use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 for granting new trials based on the weight of the evidence, ensuring that juries retain their fundamental role as arbiters of fact and credibility, thereby strengthening the finality of jury verdicts and limiting judicial overreach.
