Damiano v. McDaniel

Supreme Court of Florida
689 So. 2d 1059 (1997)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Florida's four-year statute of repose for medical malpractice begins to run from the date of the alleged malpractice incident, not from the date the resulting injury is discovered. This statute does not violate the Florida Constitution's 'access to courts' provision, even when it bars a claim before the plaintiff could have known of the injury.

Facts:

In June of 1986, Dr. McDaniel ordered a blood transfusion for his patient, Francine Damiano.
The complaint alleged that Dr. McDaniel ordered the transfusion in a non-life-threatening situation, despite knowing of the risk of HIV contamination in donated blood at the time.
The blood Ms. Damiano received was infected with HIV.
In April of 1990, more than four years after the transfusion, Francine Damiano tested positive for HIV.
By the time of her diagnosis, Francine Damiano had unknowingly transmitted the virus to her husband, Alfred Damiano.

Procedural Posture:

Alfred and Francine Damiano filed a medical malpractice suit against Dr. McDaniel in a Florida trial court in 1992.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Dr. McDaniel, ruling that the suit was barred by the four-year statute of repose.
The Damianos, as appellants, appealed the decision to the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment for Dr. McDaniel, the appellee, but certified a question of great public importance to the Supreme Court of Florida.

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Issue:

Does Florida's four-year medical malpractice statute of repose violate the 'access to courts' provision of the Florida Constitution when it is applied to bar a claim where the latent injury, HIV, did not manifest itself until after the four-year period had expired?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Grimes

No. The medical malpractice statute of repose does not violate the Florida Constitution's access to courts provision, even if it bars a claim before the injury is discovered. The court reasoned that the statute represents a legislative determination that there must be an outer limit beyond which medical malpractice suits may not be instituted. Citing precedent like Kush v. Lloyd and University of Miami v. Bogorff, the court affirmed that the repose period begins with the incident of malpractice, not the discovery of injury, and it is constitutional to bar claims even when the cause of action accrues after the period has expired. The legislature validly balanced the rights of injured persons against the need to protect health care providers from liability for endless periods, and the Court is not authorized to second-guess that judgment.

Dissenting - Chief Justice Kogan and Justice Shaw

The dissent did not provide a written opinion but noted their disagreement with the majority's conclusion.

Analysis:

This decision solidifies the absolute nature of a statute of repose in Florida medical malpractice law, distinguishing it from a statute of limitations that incorporates a discovery rule. It affirms the legislature's power to extinguish a cause of action before it is even known to the injured party, based on an 'overpowering public necessity' to limit the long-term liability of healthcare providers. The ruling effectively prioritizes finality and certainty for potential defendants over the right of access to courts for plaintiffs with latent injuries, such as those caused by HIV or other slow-developing conditions. Future litigants in similar situations are foreclosed from bringing claims if the injury manifests after the four-year window has closed, regardless of the merits of their case.

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