Dalia v. United States
441 U.S. 238, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 implicitly authorizes courts to approve such entries as part of a surveillance order, and the order is not constitutionally required to include a specific authorization for the covert entry.
Facts:
- Federal officials suspected Larry Dalia was part of a conspiracy to steal goods being shipped in interstate commerce, using his business office in Linden, New Jersey, to further the scheme.
- In March 1973, Dalia was asked to store a 'load of merchandise' in his warehouse.
- Dalia declined but directed the requesting party to an associate, Higgins, with whom Dalia agreed to share the storage fee.
- On April 3, 1973, a tractor-trailer full of fabric was stolen and transported to Higgins' warehouse.
- Following a court order authorizing electronic surveillance of Dalia's office, FBI agents secretly entered the office at midnight on April 5, 1973.
- The agents spent three hours inside the building installing an electronic listening device ('bug') in the ceiling.
- The bug recorded conversations in which Dalia discussed the robbery with confederates, providing evidence of his active participation.
- On May 16, 1973, FBI agents secretly re-entered Dalia's office to remove the surveillance device.
Procedural Posture:
- Larry Dalia was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey for conspiracy to steal an interstate shipment of fabric and related offenses.
- Before trial, Dalia filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from a bug installed in his office, arguing the covert entry to install it was unlawful because it was not explicitly authorized in the court's surveillance order.
- The District Court denied the suppression motion.
- After being convicted on two counts by a jury, Dalia renewed his motion, and the District Court held an evidentiary hearing.
- The District Court again denied the motion, holding that authorization for covert entry was implicit in the surveillance order and that the entry was reasonable.
- Dalia (appellant) appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment, agreeing with the lower court that separate authorization for a surreptitious entry was not required.
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Issue:
Does a court order authorizing electronic surveillance under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which does not explicitly authorize covert entry, permit law enforcement to secretly enter private premises to install the surveillance device without violating the statute or the Fourth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Powell
Yes. A court order that authorizes electronic surveillance but is silent on the method of execution permits law enforcement to conduct a covert entry to install the device without violating Title III or the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment. The language and legislative history of Title III demonstrate that Congress intended to authorize courts to approve electronic surveillance without limiting the reasonable means necessary to accomplish it, implicitly including covert entry, which is essential for most bugging operations. The Fourth Amendment requires warrants to be based on probable cause and to particularly describe the place to be searched and things to be seized, but it does not require a specification of the precise manner of execution. The method of execution is left to officer discretion, subject to subsequent judicial review for reasonableness.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Stevens
No. Neither Title III nor the Constitution authorizes covert, forcible entry to install a listening device without explicit judicial sanction. Given that breaking and entering is a criminal act, statutory authority for such an intrusive police tactic should not be read into congressional silence. Title III is an exhaustive and detailed statute, and its failure to mention such a controversial power indicates that Congress did not grant it. The legislative history does not support the majority's conclusion; it shows Congress intended to create a system with strict controls, not to provide law enforcement with unbounded authority to commit illegal acts in executing a surveillance order. The presumption should be that Congress does not authorize the Executive to violate state criminal laws or encroach on privacy without an unambiguous statutory mandate.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mr. Justice Brennan
No. Even if Title III is read to authorize covert entries, the Fourth Amendment requires specific, prior judicial authorization for such an entry. Breaking and entering to plant a bug is a distinct and additional invasion of privacy beyond the electronic surveillance itself; it is tantamount to an independent search and seizure that breaches physical as well as conversational privacy. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause requires that the necessity for this separate physical invasion be determined by a neutral magistrate beforehand, rather than being left to the discretion of the executing officer. Deriving authority for a physical invasion from an order authorizing only electronic surveillance violates the principle that a warrant's scope must be strictly limited.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the practical authority of law enforcement executing electronic surveillance warrants under Title III by resolving a circuit split in favor of the government. It establishes that the authority to make a covert entry is implicit in an order to 'bug' a premises, removing the need for investigators to seek explicit judicial permission for the break-in. The ruling shifts the legal battleground from pre-execution authorization to post-execution review of reasonableness, making it more difficult for defendants to challenge the legality of the entry itself. This interpretation solidifies the distinction in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence between the authorization of a search (which requires particularity) and the method of its execution (which is governed by a general reasonableness standard).
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