Daigrepont v. Louisiana State Racing Com'n
663 So.2d 840, 1995 WL 631223 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
Under Louisiana Civil Code art. 2315.6, the right to recover for bystander mental anguish is strictly limited to the classes of beneficiaries explicitly listed in the statute, which does not include stepparents, and requires the claimant to either view the event or arrive at the scene shortly thereafter, which is not satisfied by viewing a videotape of the event after the fact.
Facts:
- Ronnie L. Daigrepont was a jockey who was severely injured during a horse race at Jefferson Downs on April 18, 1990.
- During the race, he lost control of his horse, fell to the ground, and was struck in the head by an oncoming horse.
- Vickie P. Daigrepont, Ronnie's stepmother who had raised him since he was three years old, was working at the race track and witnessed the accident on a television monitor.
- Carl Daigrepont, Ronnie's biological father, arrived at the race track shortly after the accident.
- After being informed of the accident, Carl Daigrepont rushed to the hospital emergency room to be with his son.
- At a later time, Carl Daigrepont viewed a video tape of his son's accident.
Procedural Posture:
- Ronnie Daigrepont and his parents, Carl and Vickie Daigrepont, filed a lawsuit against the Louisiana State Racing Commission and its stewards in a Louisiana trial court.
- The defendants filed an exception of no cause of action against Vickie Daigrepont's claim for mental anguish.
- The defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment against Carl Daigrepont's claim for mental anguish.
- The trial court granted both the exception and the motion, dismissing the claims of Vickie and Carl Daigrepont.
- Vickie and Carl Daigrepont (appellants) appealed the trial court's dismissals to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
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Issue:
Under Louisiana Civil Code art. 2315.6, does the term 'mother' include a stepmother who raised the injured party, and does the requirement to 'view an event' or 'come upon the scene' encompass viewing a video recording of the event after it occurred?
Opinions:
Majority - Landrieu, J.
No. Louisiana's bystander recovery statute must be strictly construed and does not provide a cause of action for a stepmother or for a father who did not witness the event or its immediate aftermath at the scene. The court reasoned that when a law is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written without searching for legislative intent. Reading Article 2315.6 'in pari materia' with related statutes, the term 'mother' is limited to a biological or adoptive mother, excluding a stepmother. For the father's claim, the statute explicitly requires that the claimant either 'view an event' or 'come upon the scene of the event soon thereafter.' The court held that arriving at the general location, being informed of the accident, going to the hospital, and later viewing a videotape does not satisfy this strict statutory requirement.
Concurring - Barry, J.
I agree with the result reached by the majority. However, the majority's statement questioning whether viewing an accident on a television monitor would satisfy the statute is 'gratuitous' and 'not germane to the issue.' Because the court had already determined that the stepmother had no right to recover based on her status as a stepmother rather than a biological or adoptive mother, it was unnecessary and inappropriate to speculate on the separate issue of viewing the event on a monitor.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a strict constructionist approach to Louisiana's bystander recovery statute, emphasizing that courts will not expand the legislatively-defined categories of eligible claimants. It establishes a clear, bright-line rule that familial relationships like that of a stepparent, no matter how close, do not grant standing under Article 2315.6. Furthermore, the ruling strictly defines the 'contemporaneous perception' requirement, excluding technologically-mediated viewing after the event and reinforcing the necessity of direct, immediate sensory experience of the accident or its immediate aftermath.
