Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento
41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 10 Cal. 4th 368, 895 P.2d 900 (1995)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Damage to private property incidentally caused by law enforcement officers in the course of apprehending a criminal suspect does not constitute a taking or damaging for public use that would require just compensation under the California Constitution. Any potential liability for such damage is governed by tort law principles and the statutory immunities of the Tort Claims Act, not inverse condemnation.
Facts:
- Christopher Nash, an armed robbery suspect reputed to be armed and dangerous, was under surveillance by law enforcement officers.
- On June 22, 1987, Nash and his girlfriend drove to and entered Rogers Food and Liquor store, a business owned and operated by Customer Company.
- The arrival of marked police vehicles at the store alerted Nash to the police presence, and after a failed attempt to flee through a rear exit, he retreated back inside.
- The police evacuated the store clerk and Nash's girlfriend, but Nash barricaded himself inside and refused to surrender for several hours.
- After negotiation attempts failed, law enforcement officers determined that using tear gas was the safest way to apprehend Nash.
- Police fired approximately twelve or thirteen rounds of tear gas into the store, which eventually forced Nash from his hiding place in the attic, leading to his arrest.
- The use of tear gas caused extensive physical damage to the store's structure and contaminated its entire inventory, rendering the goods toxic waste and resulting in over $275,000 in losses for Customer Company.
Procedural Posture:
- Customer Company sued the City of Sacramento and Sacramento County in the superior court, alleging causes of action for inverse condemnation and negligence.
- The superior court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the City and County.
- The superior court ruled that the police actions were a proper exercise of police power, barring the inverse condemnation claim, and that the defendants were immune from the negligence claim under the Tort Claims Act.
- Customer Company, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court's judgment in favor of the City and County, who were the appellees.
- The California Supreme Court granted review, limited solely to the issue of inverse condemnation.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the destruction of private property by police officers during an effort to apprehend a felony suspect constitute a 'taking or damaging for public use' that requires just compensation under Article I, Section 19 of the California Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - George, J.
No. The destruction of private property by police officers during an effort to apprehend a felony suspect does not constitute a 'taking or damaging for public use' that requires just compensation under the California Constitution. California's just compensation clause, Article I, Section 19, has historically applied to government's exercise of eminent domain power for public works and improvements, not to property damage incidentally caused by law enforcement activities. The addition of the 'or damaged' language to the constitution in 1879 was intended to cover consequential damages from public projects, not to create a form of constitutional tort liability. The damage here arose from a valid exercise of the state's police power under emergency conditions to avert peril, which is an exception to the just compensation requirement. To allow an inverse condemnation claim in this context would improperly circumvent the legislative framework of the Tort Claims Act and its specific immunity provisions, creating an anomaly where property damage claims are treated more favorably than personal injury claims arising from the same governmental act.
Dissenting - Baxter, J.
Yes. The deliberate physical destruction of unoffending private property by the government as a chosen means of achieving a public purpose constitutes a taking or damaging for public use that requires just compensation. The fundamental purpose of the just compensation clause is to distribute a public burden among the entire community rather than forcing it upon a single, innocent property owner. This was not 'routine negligence,' but a calculated decision to sacrifice Customer Company's property to capture a suspect for the public's benefit. Furthermore, the 'emergency exception' is inapplicable here because the government's own strategic decisions, specifically the arrival of marked police cars, were a substantial cause of the emergency standoff occurring at this particular location. When the government's own non-emergency actions create the crisis that necessitates property destruction, it cannot then claim an emergency to avoid its constitutional duty to compensate.
Concurring - Kennard, J.
No. The police action did not constitute a taking or damaging 'for public use' because the government did not put the destroyed property to any affirmative, productive use. The just compensation clause's threshold requirement of 'use' means the government must exploit some productive capacity of the property, not merely deprive the owner of it. Here, the police did not 'use' the shattered windows or the contaminated inventory; they simply destroyed them as a consequence of their efforts to capture the fugitive. This distinguishes the case from eminent domain, where property is appropriated for a specific public service. Because the damaged property was not put to any governmental use, the constitutional requirement for just compensation is not triggered, and any remedy must be sought through other legal channels like tort law or federal civil rights statutes.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the distinction between inverse condemnation and tort law in California, particularly concerning actions by law enforcement. It establishes that the just compensation clause is not a mechanism to bypass the statutory limitations and immunities of the Tort Claims Act. By classifying police-action property damage as a non-compensable police power exercise rather than a 'public use' under eminent domain, the court prioritizes operational discretion for law enforcement in emergencies. The ruling significantly narrows the path to recovery for innocent property owners, forcing them to pursue more difficult tort claims where governmental immunity is a major obstacle, rather than the more owner-favorable constitutional remedy of inverse condemnation.
