Cusseaux v. Pickett

Majority - Napolitano, J.S.C.

Yes, the 'battered-woman's syndrome' constitutes a cognizable affirmative cause of action under the laws of New Jersey. The court emphasized that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted 'only in the rarest of instances,' requiring a 'meticulous' and 'indulgent' examination of the complaint to ascertain if a cause of action can be 'gleaned even from an obscure statement of a claim' (citing Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics). While New Jersey courts, in State v. Kelly, had previously recognized battered-woman's syndrome as a defense in criminal cases (to establish self-defense), it had not yet been recognized as an affirmative civil cause of action. The court relied on the legislative intent of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, which declares domestic violence a serious crime and mandates courts to provide 'the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide' and 'access to both emergent and long-term civil and criminal remedies.' The opinion reasoned that existing civil laws for assault and battery are insufficient to address the unique, long-term harm suffered by victims of continuous domestic violence, which culminates in the battered-woman's syndrome. To deny a cause of action for this syndrome, which results from a 'continuing pattern of abuse,' would be contrary to public policy and the legislative mandate to protect victims, effectively condoning continued abuse by limiting recovery to only individual incidents subject to short statutes of limitation. The court explicitly rejected the Louisiana court's reasoning in Laughlin v. Breaux that each incident is a separate cause of action, instead deeming the battered-woman's syndrome a 'continuing tort.' Therefore, the court concluded that common law and public policy require the judiciary to 'fill the interstices' where the Legislature has not gone far enough, thereby recognizing the battered-woman's syndrome as a new, affirmative civil cause of action.