Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
388 U.S. 130 (1967)
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Rule of Law:
A public figure who brings a defamation lawsuit must prove that the publisher of the defamatory falsehood acted with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge of the statement's falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This extends the constitutional protections for speech first established for public officials in New York Times v. Sullivan to public figures.
Facts:
- In the first case, Wallace Butts, the athletic director of the University of Georgia, was the subject of an article in The Saturday Evening Post, a magazine published by Curtis Publishing Co.
- The article alleged that Butts had conspired to 'fix' a 1962 football game by giving Georgia's plays and defensive patterns to the opposing coach, Paul 'Bear' Bryant of the University of Alabama.
- The magazine's sole source for this story was George Burnett, an insurance salesman with a criminal record for check fraud, who claimed to have overheard the information on a crossed telephone line.
- Curtis Publishing Co. conducted a minimal investigation, failing to review Burnett's notes, interview another person allegedly present during the call, or consult with football experts about the credibility of the information before publication.
- In the second case, Edwin Walker was a former U.S. Army general who had resigned to engage in political activity and was a prominent critic of federal intervention in desegregation efforts.
- Walker was present on the campus of the University of Mississippi during a riot opposing the court-ordered enrollment of James Meredith, the university's first Black student.
- The Associated Press (AP) distributed a news dispatch from a correspondent on the scene which stated that Walker had taken command of the violent crowd and led a charge against federal marshals.
- Walker admitted to being on campus and speaking to protestors but denied leading a charge, claiming he had counseled for peaceful protest.
Procedural Posture:
- In Butts: Wallace Butts sued Curtis Publishing Co. for libel in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
- The jury returned a verdict for Butts, awarding $60,000 in general damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages, which the trial judge later reduced to a total of $460,000.
- After the verdict, Curtis filed a motion for a new trial arguing that the constitutional standard from the newly-decided New York Times v. Sullivan should apply; the motion was denied.
- Curtis Publishing Co. (appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's judgment, holding Curtis had waived its constitutional claims.
- In Walker: Edwin Walker sued the Associated Press (AP) for libel in a Texas state trial court.
- The jury awarded Walker $500,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages.
- The trial judge upheld the compensatory award but nullified the punitive damages, finding no evidence of malice.
- Both parties appealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's judgment.
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Issue:
Does the First Amendment's protection for speech and press require a 'public figure' who sues for libel to prove that a defamatory falsehood relating to an issue of public interest was published with 'actual malice'?
Opinions:
Plurality - Justice Harlan
No. A public figure who is not a public official may recover damages for a defamatory falsehood on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. Unlike public officials, public figures do not have the same access to privileges like absolute immunity for their statements, and the analogy to seditious libel is weaker. However, the public's interest in their affairs requires a constitutional standard higher than mere negligence. Applying this standard, Curtis Publishing Co.'s conduct was an extreme departure from responsible publishing standards due to its shoddy investigation of a non-urgent story, so Butts's judgment is affirmed. In contrast, the AP's report on Walker concerned 'hot news' from a reliable correspondent on the scene, so its conduct was not highly unreasonable, and Walker's judgment is reversed.
Concurring - Chief Justice Warren
Yes. The First Amendment requires that a public figure prove 'actual malice'—knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth—to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood. The distinction between 'public officials' and 'public figures' has no basis in First Amendment policy, as both are often involved in the resolution of important public questions and have access to media to counter criticism. A single, clear standard from New York Times v. Sullivan is preferable to the plurality's vague 'highly unreasonable conduct' test. Under the 'actual malice' standard, the evidence of Curtis's slipshod investigation and its 'sophisticated muckraking' policy supported a finding of reckless disregard for the truth, justifying the verdict for Butts. Conversely, there was no evidence that the AP acted with reckless disregard in reporting on Walker's actions during a chaotic event, so that judgment must be reversed.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Black
Yes, but this standard does not go far enough. The First Amendment provides absolute protection for the press from libel judgments, and the Court should abandon the New York Times standard altogether. The Court's approach of weighing facts on a case-by-case basis is a violation of the Seventh Amendment and creates a 'quagmire' similar to obscenity law, where no one can be certain what is or is not constitutionally protected. The only rule consistent with the First Amendment is one that leaves the press completely free from the harassment of libel lawsuits. Therefore, the judgment against Curtis Publishing Co. should be reversed along with the judgment against the Associated Press.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Brennan
Yes. The New York Times 'actual malice' standard is the correct constitutional rule for public figures. While there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find Curtis Publishing acted with actual malice, the jury in the Butts case was given improper instructions. The trial judge's definition of malice included concepts like 'ill will, spite, hatred' and 'culpable negligence,' which are inconsistent with the constitutional standard of reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. Because the jury did not decide the case under the correct constitutional standard, the proper remedy is to remand for a new trial with correct instructions, not to affirm the judgment.
Analysis:
This landmark decision extended the 'actual malice' standard from New York Times v. Sullivan to cover 'public figures' in addition to public officials. Although the Court was fractured and produced no majority opinion on the legal standard, the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Warren and others established the New York Times test as the controlling rule for a majority of the justices. This ruling significantly broadened the First Amendment's protection for the press, giving it more 'breathing space' to report on individuals who, by their fame or actions, are involved in matters of public concern. The case established a critical framework for defamation law that balances free expression with reputational interests, prompting future litigation to define who qualifies as a public figure.
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