Curry v. Superior Court
87 Cal. Rptr. 361, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 470 P.2d 345 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
Once jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial, a judge's determination that erroneously admitted evidence makes a fair trial impossible does not constitute "legal necessity" to declare a mistrial without the defendant's consent. A retrial under such circumstances is barred by the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
Facts:
- Jimmy Carney called out to Christine Patterson, an acquaintance, firing a gun twice into the air to get her attention.
- Carney and Patterson then walked together and stopped at a service station.
- While Carney was on the phone, petitioners Clinton Curry and Lionel Pete McCoy arrived in a car.
- Curry accused Carney of disrespecting his mother, and an altercation began.
- McCoy handed a gun to Curry.
- As Carney started to run, McCoy yelled, "Shoot him," and Curry fired, fatally striking Carney in the head.
- At some point prior to the trial, Patterson, the sole eyewitness, had fired a gun at a third party, Louis Lee.
- Patterson had also previously been under psychiatric care and had attempted suicide shortly after Carney's shooting.
Procedural Posture:
- Clinton Curry and Lionel Pete McCoy were charged by indictment with murder.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial in a California superior court (the trial court/court of first instance).
- After the prosecution's key eyewitness testified, the trial judge, sua sponte, declared a mistrial, citing the admission of prejudicial evidence.
- The judge discharged the jury before it could reach a verdict.
- When the state sought to retry them, Curry and McCoy entered pleas of 'once in jeopardy'.
- Curry and McCoy (as petitioners) then sought a writ of prohibition from the California Supreme Court to prevent their retrial.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the California Constitution bar the retrial of a defendant when the trial judge, acting sua sponte and without the defendant's consent, declares a mistrial based on the belief that erroneously admitted evidence has made a fair trial impossible for either party?
Opinions:
Majority - Mosk, J.
Yes. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars the retrial of the defendants because the trial judge declared a mistrial without the defendants' consent and without legal necessity. The court reasoned that jeopardy attaches once the jury is impaneled and sworn. A subsequent discharge of the jury without a verdict operates as an acquittal unless the defendant consents or there is a 'legal necessity.' Here, the petitioners did not consent; their request for a cautionary jury instruction did not amount to consent for a mistrial, and their silence cannot be construed as a waiver. Furthermore, there was no legal necessity, which is limited to physical causes beyond the court's control, such as a hung jury or the illness of a judge or juror. A mere error of law or procedure, such as the admission of potentially prejudicial evidence, does not constitute legal necessity. The court explicitly declined to follow the more lenient federal standard from Gori v. United States, affirming that the California Constitution provides greater protection against double jeopardy, prioritizing the defendant's right to have their trial completed over a judge's paternalistic concern for fairness.
Analysis:
This case solidifies a stringent interpretation of the 'legal necessity' exception to the double jeopardy rule under the California Constitution. It establishes that a trial judge's discretionary belief that procedural or evidentiary errors have rendered a trial unfair is insufficient to justify a mistrial without the defendant's consent. The decision champions the defendant's autonomy to proceed with a chosen jury, even in the face of prejudicial error, and affirms that California can provide greater constitutional protections than the federal minimum. This precedent significantly limits a trial court's power to declare a mistrial sua sponte, thereby strengthening a defendant's protection against repeated prosecutions.
