Curry v. Curry
260 Ga. 302, 392 S.E.2d 879 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
A reconciliation agreement entered into by spouses to dismiss a pending divorce action is evaluated for enforceability using the same three-part test applied to antenuptial agreements.
Facts:
- The parties married in 1975, divorced in 1977, and remarried by common law later in 1977.
- The husband filed for divorce in 1981 and again in 1984, indicating a pattern of marital discord.
- In 1984, to resolve the pending divorce action, the parties signed a reconciliation agreement.
- The agreement stipulated that the husband would make certain payments to the wife, the divorce action would be dismissed, and the wife would be barred from all future claims for alimony or equitable property division.
- The parties remained married for another five years after signing the agreement.
- In 1989, the husband filed a new complaint for divorce.
Procedural Posture:
- The husband filed a complaint for divorce in a state trial court in 1989.
- The husband also sought an order from the court to enforce the parties' 1984 reconciliation agreement.
- The trial court held a hearing on the sole issue of the agreement's enforceability.
- The trial court entered a final judgment enforcing the reconciliation agreement.
- The wife, as appellant, was granted a discretionary appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Is a reconciliation agreement, in which one spouse waives future claims to alimony and property division, enforceable when that spouse later challenges it as unfair and unconscionable?
Opinions:
Majority - Weltner, Justice
Yes, the reconciliation agreement is enforceable. A reconciliation agreement stands on the same footing as an antenuptial agreement and is subject to the three-part test established in Scherer v. Scherer. This test requires the trial judge to determine if the agreement was obtained through fraud, duress, or misrepresentation; if it is unconscionable; and if circumstances have changed so as to make enforcement unfair. Here, the trial court correctly found no fraud or duress. While the terms may have been 'unfair' in that the wife might have received more in the 1984 divorce, the agreement was not unconscionable because the wife received the benefit she bargained for—the continuation of the marriage—and benefited from it for five years. The wife was therefore estopped from challenging the agreement's validity, and the trial judge, not a jury, is the proper party to make this determination.
Analysis:
This decision formally aligns the legal standard for enforcing reconciliation agreements with the existing standard for antenuptial agreements in Georgia, promoting freedom of contract between spouses. It clarifies that the enforceability of such agreements is a question of law for a judge, not a question of fact for a jury. The ruling distinguishes between a bargain that is merely 'unfair' and one that is legally 'unconscionable,' setting a high bar for invalidating marital contracts that were entered into freely and knowingly.
