Currier v. Virginia
2018 U.S. LEXIS 3841, 138 S. Ct. 2144 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
When a defendant consents to severing charges into separate trials, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the second trial, even if the defendant was acquitted in the first trial on an issue that is a critical component of the second charge.
Facts:
- A safe containing firearms and approximately $71,000 in cash was stolen from Paul Garrison's home.
- Police later recovered the safe from a river with the firearms still inside, but with most of the cash missing.
- Garrison's nephew confessed to the theft and implicated Michael Currier as his accomplice.
- A neighbor also reported seeing Michael Currier leaving the Garrison home around the time of the crime.
- Currier had prior convictions for burglary and larceny, making him a 'convicted felon' for the purposes of a potential firearm possession charge.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury indicted Michael Currier for burglary, grand larceny, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
- To avoid the prejudicial effect of Currier's prior convictions, Currier and the prosecution jointly requested to sever the charges.
- The Virginia trial court granted the request, ordering the burglary and larceny charges to be tried first, followed by a separate trial for the felon-in-possession charge.
- At the first trial, a jury acquitted Currier of burglary and grand larceny.
- Before the second trial, Currier moved to dismiss the firearm charge, arguing a second trial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause's issue-preclusion component. The trial court denied the motion.
- At the second trial, a jury convicted Currier of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- Currier appealed to the Virginia Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction, rejecting his double jeopardy claim.
- The Supreme Court of Virginia summarily affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar a second trial for a charge that was severed from other charges at the defendant's request, after the defendant was acquitted on the charges in the first trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Gorsuch, J.
No, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the second trial. A defendant who consents to having charges tried separately waives any subsequent double jeopardy claim. The Clause protects against government oppression, not the consequences of a defendant's voluntary strategic choice. Distinguishing Ashe v. Swenson, the Court reasoned that Currier consented to the second trial, unlike the defendant in Ashe. Citing Jeffers v. United States, the Court affirmed the principle that when a defendant 'elects to have the... offenses tried separately,' a subsequent trial does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court rejected the argument that Currier had 'no choice,' stating that facing a difficult strategic decision is not the same as having no choice at all.
Plurality - Gorsuch, J.
The plurality opinion (Part III) further argued against importing civil issue preclusion principles into criminal law via the Double Jeopardy Clause. It reasoned that the text of the Clause speaks of barring retrial of the 'same offence,' not the relitigation of issues or evidence. Historical common law practice and contemporary precedent, such as Dowling v. United States, support the conclusion that if a second trial is permissible, the admission of evidence is governed by evidentiary rules, not the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Concurring - Kennedy, J.
No, the second trial is not barred. The core principle that resolves this case is that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice. Because Currier consented to severing the charges, which led to the second prosecution, he cannot later use the Clause to forestall that prosecution. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to reexamine the protections of Ashe v. Swenson, as whatever rights a defendant has under Ashe can be lost when the defendant agrees to a second prosecution.
Dissenting - Ginsburg, J.
Yes, the principles of double jeopardy should have barred the relitigation of key facts in the second trial. A defendant’s consent to severing charges is not a waiver of the issue-preclusion component of the Double Jeopardy Clause. An acquittal has a special finality. The first jury's acquittal necessarily determined that Currier was not involved in the burglary and larceny. Therefore, the government should have been precluded from relitigating that ultimate fact in the second trial to prove that he possessed the firearms during the commission of that crime.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the 'consent' exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause, particularly in the context of issue preclusion under Ashe v. Swenson. The ruling establishes that a defendant's voluntary, strategic decision to sever charges effectively waives the right to later claim that a second trial is barred, even after an acquittal. This prioritizes the consequence of the defendant's procedural choice over the finality of a jury's factual findings in the first trial. For future cases, this makes it significantly more difficult for defendants who agree to severance to use an acquittal in one trial as a shield against prosecution in a subsequent, related trial.
