Currier v. Currier
1992 WL 103528, 599 So.2d 456 (1992)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
For purposes of permanent alimony in Louisiana, "fault" precluding an award continues to be broadly defined as conduct or substantial acts violative of marital duties and responsibilities that are a serious and independent contributory or proximate cause of the separation, notwithstanding recent revisions to divorce statutes that narrowed the grounds for divorce.
Facts:
- Mildred and Jerry Currier married in January 1969 and lived together in Caddo Parish, eventually having one son.
- Sometime in 1985, Jerry Currier left the marital home, and the couple never reconciled.
- Mildred Currier filed for divorce in March 1991, seeking a divorce based on more than one year of separation without reconciliation, and also requested permanent alimony.
- Jerry Currier alleged that Mildred Currier's conduct reflected her "fault," specifically citing overuse of medication, frequent arguments, frequent accusations of infidelity, inadequate sexual responsiveness, and post-separation adultery.
- Mildred Currier maintained that Jerry Currier left home without any reason and, despite her pleas, would not return.
- Mildred Currier explained that her medication use was for various sinus and ulcer-related ailments, her arguments centered on Jerry Currier's abusive alcohol consumption and late hours, her infidelity accusations stemmed from his continued unexplained absences, and she only refused sexual contact on evenings of his intoxication.
- Mildred Currier admitted to dating an individual for about eight months after the physical separation but denied having sexual intercourse with him, a claim corroborated to some extent by their adult son.
- Jerry Currier earned a base monthly salary of $2515 plus quarterly-paid overtime, while Mildred Currier had a temporary job earning $311 in April 1991 and intended to seek permanent employment.
Procedural Posture:
- Mildred Currier petitioned for divorce premised upon more than one year of separation without reconciliation, and also sought alimony, in the district court in March 1991.
- An interim order granted Mildred Currier $150 per week pendente lite alimony.
- A trial on the merits was held on May 9, 1991, with the only contested issues being Mildred Currier's entitlement to, and the amount of, permanent alimony.
- The trial judge took the case under advisement.
- The trial court subsequently rendered a judgment of absolute divorce, found Mildred Currier to be without fault, and granted her $450 monthly in permanent alimony, providing written reasons.
- Jerry Currier appealed the award of spousal support to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit, as defendant-appellant.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a former wife's conduct, including overuse of medication, frequent arguments over her husband's drinking and late hours, accusations of infidelity, alleged inadequate sexual responsiveness, and post-separation dating, constitute alimony-barring "fault" under Louisiana Civil Code Article 112 after the 1990 revisions to marriage dissolution laws?
Opinions:
Majority - Hightower, J.
No, Mildred Currier's conduct did not constitute alimony-barring "fault" under Louisiana Civil Code Article 112 because the definition of fault remains broad, encompassing conduct violative of marital duties and responsibilities that proximately causes separation, despite recent statutory changes narrowing divorce grounds. The court affirmed the trial court's finding that Mrs. Currier was without fault for alimony purposes, applying the definition of "fault" from Pearce v. Pearce, 348 So.2d 75 (La.1977). This standard defines fault as "conduct or substantial acts of commission or omission by the wife violative of her marital duties and responsibilities... of a serious nature and... an independent contributory or proximate cause of the separation." The court noted that the 1990 revisions to marriage dissolution laws merely renumbered and did not alter the post-divorce alimony provisions, indicating no legislative intent to change the alimony-fault scheme, an interpretation consistent with Hornsby v. Hornsby, 592 So.2d 508 (La. App. 5th Cir.1991). The appellate court afforded great deference to the trial court's factual determinations and credibility assessments, finding no clear error. The trial court specifically resolved all factual conflicts in favor of Mrs. Currier, terming her "very believable and credible." The trial court rejected Mr. Currier's claims regarding medication overuse, arguments (finding them largely precipitated by Mr. Currier's alcohol abuse and late hours), infidelity accusations (accepting her belief given his absences), and sexual responsiveness (crediting her explanation of refusal only during his intoxication). No marital fault was found in her post-separation dating, as she denied sexual intercourse and was corroborated by their son. Regarding the amount of alimony, the court found no error in the $450 monthly award, considering Mrs. Currier's conservative expenses ($742.95 monthly), her temporary job earnings ($311 in April 1991), and her expressed desire to find permanent employment, while Mr. Currier had a substantially higher income.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying that despite statutory changes narrowing the grounds for divorce, the definition of "fault" for purposes of precluding permanent alimony under LSA-C.C. Art. 112 remains broad, encompassing serious marital misconduct that contributes to the separation, not just the specific grounds for immediate divorce. It reinforces the principle of appellate deference to trial courts' factual findings and credibility determinations in domestic relations cases, particularly given the subjective nature of "fault." Future cases will continue to apply the Pearce standard for alimony fault, emphasizing that a spouse does not need to be "totally blameless" to receive alimony and that a justifiable response to a spouse's initial fault does not constitute alimony-barring fault.
