Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc.
450 F.3d 130, 2006 WL 1541695 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
General public advocacy on a social issue does not constitute protected "opposition" activity under Title VII's anti-retaliation clause unless it has a perceptible connection to the employer's specific, allegedly unlawful employment practices. Additionally, courts will not apply Title VII to a gender discrimination claim against a religious employer if resolving the claim would require the court to evaluate the relative severity of different violations of religious doctrine, as this raises serious First Amendment questions.
Facts:
- Michele Curay-Cramer was a teacher of English and Religion at Ursuline Academy, a private Catholic school in Wilmington, Delaware.
- On the 30th anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, Curay-Cramer signed her name to a pro-choice advertisement published in a local newspaper of general circulation.
- The advertisement affirmed a commitment to protecting a woman's right to make her own reproductive choices but did not mention Ursuline Academy, any other employer, or any employment practices.
- The same day the ad appeared, Ursuline's President, Barbara Griffin, informed Curay-Cramer that the school was deeply troubled by her public support of a position contrary to Catholic doctrine and was considering her termination.
- During their meeting, Curay-Cramer also informed Griffin that she had previously volunteered for Planned Parenthood.
- Ursuline later offered to let Curay-Cramer keep her job if she publicly recanted her support for the advertisement and stated unequivocally that she was pro-life.
- Curay-Cramer refused to recant her position and was subsequently fired from her teaching position.
Procedural Posture:
- Michele Curay-Cramer filed a lawsuit against The Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, its president, and others in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware.
- The complaint alleged federal claims for retaliation and gender discrimination under Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, as well as several state-law claims.
- The defendants filed motions to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
- The District Court granted the defendants' motions, dismissing Curay-Cramer's federal claims and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
- Curay-Cramer, as appellant, appealed the District Court's dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does Title VII's prohibition on retaliation and gender discrimination prevent a religious school from terminating a teacher for signing a general, public pro-choice advertisement that does not mention employment or the employer?
Opinions:
Majority - Roth, J.
No. Title VII does not prevent a religious school from terminating a teacher under these circumstances because her action did not constitute protected opposition activity, and her discrimination claim would require impermissible judicial inquiry into religious doctrine. Regarding the retaliation claim, signing the general pro-choice advertisement was not a protected "opposition activity" under Title VII because it was not directed at any unlawful employment practice of Ursuline Academy. To be protected, opposition must identify the employer and the practice, at least by context. The advertisement was a general public statement on a political issue and had no perceptible connection to Ursuline's employment policies. Her subsequent statements to the principal could not retroactively shield her, as the decision to consider termination had already been made based on the unprotected conduct. Regarding the gender discrimination claim, adjudicating it would raise serious First Amendment questions under the constitutional avoidance doctrine from NLRB v. Catholic Bishop. To determine if Curay-Cramer was treated more harshly than similarly situated male employees who violated other tenets (e.g., being Jewish or opposing the Iraq war), the court would have to impermissibly entangle itself in religion by measuring the relative severity of different violations of Church doctrine. Absent a clear congressional intent for Title VII to apply in situations requiring such religious inquiry, the claim must be dismissed.
Analysis:
This decision refines the scope of Title VII's anti-retaliation "opposition clause," clarifying that general political speech unconnected to a specific employment practice does not qualify for protection. It establishes that an employee's protest must be sufficiently specific to put the employer on notice that the employee is opposing a discriminatory practice. More significantly, the case demonstrates the strength of the constitutional avoidance doctrine for religious employers, effectively barring disparate treatment claims that would require a secular court to interpret religious doctrine or weigh the gravity of different religious offenses. This precedent narrows the path for certain discrimination claims against religious institutions while leaving open claims that do not require such doctrinal analysis.
