Cupp v. Murphy
412 U.S. 291, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 63, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
When police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, a limited, warrantless search of the person is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if it is necessary to preserve highly evanescent evidence, even if no formal arrest has yet been made.
Facts:
- Daniel Murphy's wife was found strangled to death in her home.
- There were no signs of a break-in, suggesting the killer was known to the victim.
- After being notified of his wife's death, Murphy voluntarily came to the police station for questioning.
- At the station, police noticed a dark spot on Murphy's finger, which they suspected was dried blood.
- Police knew evidence of strangulation is often found under an assailant's fingernails and asked to take scrapings from Murphy's nails.
- Murphy refused to consent to the search and began rubbing his hands together and putting them in his pockets.
- Under protest and without a warrant, police proceeded to take samples from under Murphy's fingernails.
- The scrapings contained traces of the victim's skin, blood cells, and fabric from her nightgown.
Procedural Posture:
- Daniel Murphy was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury in an Oregon state trial court.
- Murphy (appellant) appealed his conviction to the Oregon Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction.
- After the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on his direct appeal, Murphy (petitioner) filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court, which denied the petition.
- Murphy (appellant) appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit (appellee was Cupp, the prison superintendent) reversed the District Court, holding that the search was unconstitutional.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does a limited, warrantless search of a suspect's person to preserve highly destructible evidence violate the Fourth Amendment when police have probable cause to arrest the suspect, but have not yet formally arrested him?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stewart
No. A limited search to preserve highly destructible evidence does not violate the Fourth Amendment when police have probable cause to make an arrest. The Court reasoned that although a formal arrest had not occurred, Murphy's detention constituted a seizure. Given that police had probable cause to arrest, the principles of a search incident to arrest, as established in Chimel v. California, apply. The primary justifications for a search incident to arrest are to seize weapons and prevent the destruction of evidence. Here, Murphy was aware of the police's suspicions, motivating him to destroy the evidence under his nails. Therefore, the very limited intrusion to scrape his fingernails was justified by the need to preserve the highly evanescent evidence.
Concurring - Justice Marshall
No. The warrantless search was permissible due to its extremely limited scope and the exigent circumstances. Justice Marshall emphasized that the detention, while short of a formal arrest, was a Fourth Amendment seizure. Because police had probable cause and were faced with the imminent destruction of evidence, the limited intrusion was justified. He stressed that a more extensive search would have been unconstitutional, as the scope of any search must be strictly tied to the circumstances justifying the initial intrusion.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
No. The search was permissible under these specific circumstances, but this holding should be narrowly construed. Justice Blackmun wrote to clarify that the Court's reasoning applies only to situations where no arrest has been made. He stated that different factors would govern the permissible scope of a search conducted incident to a lawful arrest.
Concurring - Justice Powell
No. While agreeing with the majority's conclusion on the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim, Justice Powell wrote separately to state his view that federal habeas corpus relief should generally not be available to re-litigate Fourth Amendment claims when the state has provided a full and fair opportunity to do so.
Dissenting - Justice Douglas
Yes. The Court should remand the case for a determination of probable cause, which is questionable on the record. Justice Douglas argued that the police's failure to arrest Murphy for a month after the search suggests they lacked probable cause at the time. Without a valid arrest, the search cannot be justified as incident to arrest under Chimel. He contended that the police should have detained Murphy and obtained a warrant, and that the majority's decision lowers the Fourth Amendment standard from 'probable cause' to mere 'suspicion,' creating a dangerous erosion of constitutional rights.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The Court should not decide the constitutional question without first establishing the existence of probable cause. Justice Brennan argued that the Court was prematurely creating a new exception to the warrant requirement on a disputed factual record. The proper course would be to remand the case to the Court of Appeals to decide in the first instance whether probable cause to arrest or search actually existed.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a narrow but significant exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, effectively extending the 'search incident to arrest' rationale to pre-arrest situations. It creates a bridge between a 'Terry' stop and a full custodial arrest, allowing a limited search for evidence based on probable cause to arrest combined with exigent circumstances (i.e., the imminent destruction of evidence). The ruling provides law enforcement with a crucial tool for preserving evidence in fast-moving investigations but requires a tight nexus between the probable cause, the limited nature of the search, and the evanescent nature of the evidence sought. Future cases will explore the boundaries of what constitutes a 'limited' search and 'evanescent' evidence under this framework.
