Cunningham v. California
127 S. Ct. 856 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial prohibits a state sentencing scheme that allows a judge to find facts, other than a prior conviction, by a preponderance of the evidence to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum. The relevant 'statutory maximum' is the maximum sentence a judge may impose based solely on the facts reflected in the jury's verdict or admitted by the defendant, not the highest possible sentence in the statute.
Facts:
- John Cunningham engaged in the continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14.
- The offense carried three possible prison terms under California law: a lower term of 6 years, a middle term of 12 years, and an upper term of 16 years.
- Following a jury conviction, the trial judge held a sentencing hearing to determine the appropriate term.
- At the hearing, the judge found several aggravating circumstances, including that Cunningham's victim was particularly vulnerable.
- The judge also found that Cunningham's violent conduct indicated he was a serious danger to the community.
- The judge found one mitigating circumstance: Cunningham had no prior criminal record.
- Based on a determination that the aggravating facts outweighed the mitigating fact, the judge imposed the upper term sentence of 16 years.
Procedural Posture:
- John Cunningham was convicted by a jury in a California trial court of continuous sexual abuse of a child.
- At a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced Cunningham to the 'upper term' of 16 years, based on the judge's own finding of aggravating facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
- Cunningham appealed the sentence to the California Court of Appeal.
- The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's sentence.
- The California Supreme Court denied Cunningham's petition for review.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Sixth Amendment question.
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Issue:
Does California's determinate sentencing law, which allows a judge to find aggravating facts by a preponderance of the evidence to impose an elevated 'upper term' sentence, violate a defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a jury trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
Yes, California's determinate sentencing law violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Court's precedents establish a bright-line rule that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Under California's law, the statutory maximum is the middle term, as that is the maximum sentence a judge can impose based solely on the jury's verdict. Because the law allows a judge to find additional facts to impose the higher, upper term sentence, it unconstitutionally permits judicial fact-finding to increase punishment. The Court rejected the argument that California's system is comparable to the post-Booker advisory federal system, clarifying that California's scheme is mandatory, not advisory, as judges are required to impose the middle term unless they find aggravating facts.
Dissenting - Justice Kennedy
No, the California law should be upheld. The Court's entire line of cases following Apprendi is incorrect and causes widespread harm to the criminal justice system. A more principled approach would be to distinguish between sentencing enhancements based on the nature of the offense, which should be found by a jury, and those based on the nature of the offender, which a judge can properly determine. Factors relating to the defendant's background, remorse, or cooperation are traditionally within the judge's province. This distinction would allow for systems of guided discretion that leverage the expertise of judges without violating the core concerns of the Sixth Amendment.
Dissenting - Justice Alito
No, California's sentencing law is constitutionally permissible. The California system is indistinguishable in any significant respect from the advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines scheme that the Court approved in United States v. Booker. Both systems give trial judges discretion in sentencing but subject that discretion to appellate review for 'reasonableness.' Both effectively require a sentencing judge to find some factor to justify a sentence above a baseline. Since the post-Booker federal system, which relies on judicial fact-finding constrained by reasonableness review, satisfies the Sixth Amendment, California's analogous system should be upheld as well.
Analysis:
This decision solidified the 'Apprendi/Blakely rule' by applying it to a common type of state determinate sentencing scheme, holding that a presumptive or standard sentence is the 'statutory maximum' for Sixth Amendment purposes. The ruling significantly impacted state sentencing systems by invalidating mandatory guidelines that vested sentence-enhancing fact-finding power in judges. It forced many states to either amend their laws to require jury findings for aggravating factors, render their sentencing guidelines purely advisory (like the federal system post-Booker), or shift to different sentencing models. The case underscores the Court's formalistic, bright-line approach to the Sixth Amendment, rejecting functional arguments that the scheme was 'reasonable' or similar to other constitutional systems.
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