Crowe v. De Gioia

Majority - Long, J.A.D.

Yes, an express oral agreement for lifetime support and property transfer between unmarried cohabitants is enforceable, and damages and specific performance can be awarded, even when sexual services were part of the relationship but not the explicit, inseparable basis of the promise, and the Statute of Frauds does not bar enforcement of a property transfer where there has been exceptional full performance. The court affirmed the trial judge's findings that Crowe and De Gioia cohabited for 20 years and that De Gioia expressly promised to take care of Crowe for the rest of his life. It rejected De Gioia's argument of insufficient consideration, noting that Crowe provided a home, cooked for him, and was his social companion for two decades, which constitutes ample bargained-for detriment. The court clarified that the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in Kozlowski v. Kozlowski does not preclude recovery merely because sexual services were 'part and parcel' of the relationship; relief is only barred if the agreement is 'explicitly and inseparably founded on sexual services,' which was not the case here. The court further clarified that Kozlowski does not require the plaintiff to actively aid the defendant in their business or for the defendant to promise to share all business assets, but rather a promise of support for life, which was found. It also stated that 'holding out' as husband and wife is not an element of a palimony action, emphasizing the enforceability of agreements between unmarried parties regardless of how they presented their relationship to the world. The court agreed with the trial judge's finding of cohabitation, defining it broadly as 'the mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties and obligations which are usually manifested by married people,' and finding that De Gioia's business nature did not negate his cohabitation with Crowe. Regarding the property transfer, the court affirmed that a contractual agreement to convey property based on valid consideration is enforceable. It rejected the Statute of Frauds defense, applying the 'full performance' exception from Klockner v. Green, where Crowe's daily activities as a companion and housekeeper were deemed of 'exceptional character' and not easily assigned a monetary value, thus mandating specific performance of the contract. The court affirmed the lump sum damages calculation, noting that the trial judge strictly followed the methodology mandated by the Supreme Court in Kozlowski, which involved determining annual support, multiplying by life expectancy, and discounting to present value using court rule tables, despite recognizing arguments that this method might be inaccurate due to fluctuating interest or inflation. It also affirmed the trial judge's determination of Crowe's weekly needs as reasonable, falling within the trial judge's discretion. The court rejected Crowe's claim for 'equitable distribution' of De Gioia's other property, stating that where an express contract exists, equitable remedies beyond contract enforcement are generally not needed. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of counsel fees, citing the Supreme Court's prior ruling in Crowe I that counsel fees are generally not allowed in non-matrimonial actions under R. 4:42-9, and deferred to the Supreme Court to reconsider this policy.