Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Company
109 Wash. 2d 581, 746 P.2d 1198 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
Owners and operators of aircraft are liable for ground damage caused by the operation of the aircraft only upon a showing of negligence; strict liability does not apply because modern aviation is not considered an abnormally dangerous activity.
Facts:
- An aircraft owned by Cox Aircraft Co. had recently been converted from a piston-driven to a turbine engine, with FAA certification of the fuel system still pending.
- On December 19, 1984, Hal Joines was piloting the aircraft over the Olympic Peninsula.
- The aircraft's engine ran out of fuel in mid-flight.
- Joines was forced to make an emergency crash-landing at Alki Point in West Seattle.
- The plane landed on the roof of Douglas Crosby's garage, causing property damage.
Procedural Posture:
- Douglas Crosby sued Hal Joines and Cox Aircraft Co. in the trial court, alleging claims for negligence and strict liability.
- The defendants denied liability and filed a third-party complaint against Parker Hannifin Corporation.
- The trial court granted Crosby's motion for partial summary judgment, holding the defendants strictly liable for the damage.
- The defendants, as appellants, appealed the trial court's ruling on summary judgment to an appellate court.
- The Washington Supreme Court accepted certification to hear the appeal directly.
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Issue:
Should owners and operators of aircraft be held strictly liable for damage to persons or property on the ground caused by the operation of the aircraft?
Opinions:
Majority - Callow, J.
No, owners and operators of aircraft should not be held strictly liable for ground damage; liability should be based on principles of negligence. The court rejects the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520A, which imposes strict liability for ground damage from aircraft, because modern aviation no longer qualifies as an 'abnormally dangerous activity.' Analyzing the factors from Restatement § 520, the court finds that while a crash can cause great harm (factor b), the overall risk is not high (factor a) and can be significantly reduced by the exercise of reasonable care (factor c). Furthermore, aviation is a matter of common usage, appropriate over populated areas, and its value to the community outweighs its risks (factors d, e, f). The court reasoned it would be inconsistent to apply strict liability for ground victims when passengers on the same aircraft must prove negligence to recover, and noted that plaintiffs can use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to help establish negligence.
Dissenting - Brachtenbach, J.
Yes, owners and operators of aircraft should be held strictly liable for ground damage. As a matter of policy and fairness, the loss from a crash should be borne by the party who chose to engage in the activity of flying for their own benefit, not by the wholly innocent person on the ground. The majority's holding places an unfair and often insurmountable burden of proof on the ground victim, which can effectively deny their right to recovery due to the high cost of litigation. The dissent argues that the Restatement's § 520A was intended to be a special, standalone rule imposing strict liability for aviation ground damage, independent of the general § 520 analysis of 'abnormally dangerous' activities. Drawing parallels to strict products liability, the dissent concludes that the aviation enterprise is in the best position to absorb and spread the risk of loss through insurance.
Analysis:
This decision represents a significant departure from the historical treatment of aviation as an ultrahazardous activity subject to strict liability. By rejecting Restatement § 520A, the court aligned Washington's aviation tort law with general negligence principles, reflecting a judicial recognition of the maturation and increased safety of the aviation industry. This ruling places a higher burden on plaintiffs, who must now prove fault to recover for ground damage, potentially making it more difficult for individuals with small claims to obtain compensation. The case solidifies the modern majority trend away from strict liability for aviation accidents, influencing how future cases involving ground damage are litigated.
