Crist v. Civil Air Patrol
1967 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1673, 278 N.Y.S.2d 430, 53 Misc. 2d 289 (1967)
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Rule of Law:
The owner of an aircraft is not strictly liable for personal injury or property damage sustained on the ground as a result of a crash; liability must be based on a finding of negligence.
Facts:
- On November 16, 1963, a C-45 Beechcraft airplane owned by Civil Air Patrol, Inc. took off from Zahn’s Airport in Amityville, New York.
- The flight was conducted in the course of Civil Air Patrol's business by authorized personnel.
- Shortly after takeoff, the airplane crashed on the lawn of property owned by Stanley Kata, located approximately one-half mile from the airport.
- The pilot and two occupants of the plane were killed on impact.
- The crash caused personal injuries to Stanley Kata, his wife, his children, and a visiting relative's family.
- The crash also resulted in damage to the Kata family's house and two parked automobiles.
Procedural Posture:
- Stanley Kata and other injured parties (plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit against Civil Air Patrol, Inc. (defendant) in the Supreme Court of New York, a trial-level court.
- The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, arguing that the defendant was liable as a matter of law.
- The trial court considered the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
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Issue:
Is an owner of an aircraft strictly liable, under a theory of trespass, for personal injury and property damage sustained on the ground as a result of the aircraft crashing?
Opinions:
Majority - Thomas P. Farley, J.
No. The owner of an aircraft is not strictly liable for ground damage under a trespass theory; liability must be based on a finding of negligence. The court rejected the older precedent established in Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Dunlop, which imposed absolute liability on the theory that flying was an ultrahazardous activity and a pilot had a 'constructive intent' to trespass wherever the plane might fall. The court reasoned that technological advances have made aviation far safer and more controllable, dissipating the early fears that justified the ultrahazardous classification. Therefore, a constructive intent to commit trespass can no longer be realistically imputed from the mere act of flying. The court also held that while the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) creates a permissible inference of negligence, it does not compel such a finding. Because a jury could infer either that the crash resulted from negligence or from an unavoidable mishap, the issue is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant shift in New York tort law, moving the legal treatment of aviation accidents away from strict liability and toward a standard negligence framework. By rejecting the characterization of flying as an ultrahazardous activity, the court aligned aviation torts with other areas of law, like automobile accidents, where fault must be proven. This case clarifies that while the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is available to plaintiffs in plane crash cases to help get their case to a jury, it does not create a presumption of liability. The ruling reinforces the jury's role as the ultimate fact-finder in determining whether negligence or an unavoidable accident caused the crash.
