Cremins v. Clancy
612 N.E.2d 1183, 415 Mass. 289 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
Social host liability for injuries caused by an intoxicated guest's negligent driving extends only to hosts who had effective control over the supply of alcohol and either served or provided the liquor to an intoxicated guest, even if the guest is a minor.
Facts:
- Seventeen-year-old Brian Jordan, accompanied by Eric Callahan, arrived at seventeen-year-old John Clancy, Jr.'s home with two cases of beer while Clancy's parents were away.
- The beer was brought into Clancy's residence and placed on the kitchen counter, where Clancy, Jordan, and four other friends (all seventeen or eighteen) played a drinking game and helped themselves to the beer.
- After about two and a half hours, Clancy indicated it was time to leave, and the unconsumed beer was placed in a station wagon belonging to Clancy's family.
- Clancy drove the station wagon around town for about an hour, during which Jordan continued to drink beer.
- Clancy, Jordan, and Callahan stopped at Brett Jackson's home, where Jordan was obviously intoxicated upon arrival.
- Around midnight, Jordan solicited a ride back to Clancy's home to retrieve his own automobile; Clancy remained at Jackson's residence.
- Jordan retrieved his automobile and, while driving alone towards his home, crossed into the opposite lane and collided head-on with Paul J. and Donna A. Cremins' vehicle.
- Jordan was intoxicated at the time of the accident, and Clancy knew that it was illegal for Jordan and the other youths to drink and that drinking impaired driving ability, and should have known Jordan was intoxicated when he left Clancy's car.
- The beer which caused Jordan's intoxication was beer he had brought to Clancy's home; Clancy considered the supply of beer to belong to him, Jordan, and Callahan together.
Procedural Posture:
- Paul J. and Donna A. Cremins (plaintiffs) sued John W. Clancy, Jr. (defendant) and Brian B. Jordan (codefendant) in the Superior Court for negligence.
- A jury found codefendant Jordan negligent in operating his car and that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries, awarding the plaintiffs $405,000 in damages against Jordan.
- The jury also answered "no" to a special question asking if defendant Clancy had been "negligent in his conduct as a social host."
- Judgment was entered for Clancy on the jury's verdict.
- The plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was denied.
- The case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on its own motion.
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Issue:
Does a social host owe a common law duty of care to third parties injured by an intoxicated minor guest when the host did not provide or effectively control the supply of alcohol that the guest brought and consumed?
Opinions:
Majority - Greaney, J.
No, a social host does not owe a common law duty of care to third parties injured by an intoxicated minor guest when the host did not provide or effectively control the supply of alcohol that the guest brought and consumed. The court affirmed the judgment for the defendant, Clancy, holding that social host liability under a common law theory of negligence requires circumstances where the host served or provided liquor to an intoxicated guest, thereby exercising 'control of the liquor supply.' The court found that Clancy, like the host in Ulwick v. DeChristopher, merely provided a setting and atmosphere where Jordan could drink beer that Jordan himself brought, and which Clancy considered to belong jointly to himself, Jordan, and Callahan. In these circumstances, Clancy did not have the obligation or means to effectively control the supply of beer and stop Jordan from drinking. The court explicitly rejected the argument that a violation of liquor laws concerning minors establishes negligence per se, reiterating that such violations do not create an independent ground for civil liability in Massachusetts, unlike in some other jurisdictions. The principles from McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., Wallace v. Wilson, Dhimos v. Cormier, and Ulwick v. DeChristopher continue to govern social host liability, emphasizing the element of control over the alcohol supply.
Concurring - O’Connor, J.
No, a social host does not owe a common law duty of care to third parties injured by an intoxicated minor guest when the host did not provide or effectively control the supply of alcohol that the guest brought and consumed. Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's result and reasoning, emphasizing that the absence of a duty arises because the defendant did not create the harmful condition or situation that led to the plaintiffs' injuries. He stressed that a person generally does not owe a duty to prevent harmful consequences of a condition they did not create, unless there is a statute or special relationship recognized by common law. Since Clancy had no control over the beer supply and therefore neither served nor made the beer available, he took no action that exposed the plaintiffs to harm, and thus, no duty to the plaintiffs arose.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the principle that 'control over the liquor supply' is the dominant consideration for establishing social host liability in Massachusetts. It clarifies that merely providing a location or atmosphere for underage drinking, without actively providing or having effective control over the alcohol, is insufficient to impose a duty of care. This decision protects social hosts from liability in situations where guests bring their own alcohol, even if the host is aware of or participates in the drinking, by drawing a clear line where the host's direct involvement in providing or controlling the alcohol supply ends. It also explicitly rejects the adoption of a negligence per se rule for violations of statutes prohibiting minor drinking, thus maintaining a higher threshold for liability based on common law negligence principles rather than statutory breach alone.
