Crawley v. Hathaway
242 Ill. Dec. 677, 721 N.E.2d 1208, 309 Ill. App. 3d 486 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A written agreement for the sale of land satisfies the Statute of Frauds, even if the property description is not perfectly precise, as long as the description is sufficient to allow a surveyor to locate the property with the aid of extrinsic (parol) evidence that clarifies the parties' intent.
Facts:
- In the spring of 1995, Douglas W Crawley and Mark Hathaway negotiated for the purchase of land owned by Hathaway.
- Around June 1995, Hathaway prepared and both parties signed a handwritten document stating an 'Agreement to Buy 100 Acres More or less' consisting of pasture, timber, and tillable ground for $90,000.
- Upon signing, Crawley gave Hathaway a down payment check for $7,500, which Hathaway cashed.
- In August 1995, Hathaway commissioned a survey to acquire a legal description for the sale.
- Both Crawley and Hathaway were present for the survey and jointly directed the surveyor as to the boundary lines of the property being sold.
- After the survey was completed in October 1995, Hathaway believed the surveyed area was larger than he intended to sell.
- In January 1996, Hathaway refused to complete the sale and instead listed the property with a real estate broker for $150,000.
Procedural Posture:
- In April 1996, Douglas W Crawley sued Mark Hathaway in the circuit court of Vermilion County, seeking specific performance of the real estate contract.
- In January 1999, Hathaway filed a motion for summary judgment, raising the Statute of Frauds as a defense.
- The trial court granted Hathaway's motion for summary judgment, finding the contract unenforceable.
- Crawley appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a written contract for the sale of land that contains a general description of the property satisfy the Statute of Frauds if the specific property can be identified through extrinsic evidence, such as a subsequent survey and the parties' own actions?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice McCullough
Yes. A written contract with a general property description satisfies the Statute of Frauds where the specific property can be identified through extrinsic evidence. The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraud, not to facilitate it by allowing a party to escape a contract on a technicality. Although the handwritten document's description was general, extrinsic evidence, including the subsequent survey and the parties' joint actions in directing that survey, is admissible to clarify the specific subject matter of the contract. This evidence can enable a surveyor to locate the property, which is sufficient to satisfy the Statute. The court reasoned that from this evidence, a trier of fact could conclude the parties knew exactly what property was intended to be conveyed, creating a genuine issue of material fact that made summary judgment improper.
Dissenting - Justice Steigmann
No. A contract with a property description so bereft of detail that it could apply to thousands of parcels of land does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, and extrinsic evidence cannot be used to supply missing essential terms. The majority's reliance on parol evidence constitutes 'supply[ing] missing terms,' not merely clarifying ambiguous ones. The description of '100 acres more or less' contains no clue as to the property's location. Furthermore, the subsequent survey cannot be read together with the document because the two writings are not connected in any definite manner; they do not refer to one another. Therefore, the original document is legally insufficient on its own, and summary judgment for the seller was appropriate.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that Illinois courts will flexibly apply the Statute of Frauds to achieve equitable results and prevent the statute from being used as an instrument of fraud. By allowing extrinsic evidence, including the parties' subsequent conduct, to clarify an ambiguous property description, the court prioritized demonstrated intent over strict contractual formality. The ruling clarifies that a description is sufficient if it enables a surveyor to locate the land with outside help, lowering the bar for what constitutes an adequate description. The dissent highlights the tension in this area of law, arguing this approach risks judicial overreach by effectively creating contract terms where none existed, which could lead to uncertainty in future real estate transactions.
