Crane v. City of Arlington

Majority - Patrick E. Higginbotham

No, Officer Roper is not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage because genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding the immediate threat Tavis Crane posed, and these facts are not clearly contradicted by video evidence, preventing a determination that Roper's conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established Fourth Amendment law. The court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Crane's estate, especially when video evidence is ambiguous or incomplete and does not provide such clarity that a reasonable jury could not believe the non-movant's account. Here, the dashcam video did not show what happened inside Crane's car, leaving key facts — such as when Roper shot Crane, when Crane became unconscious, whether the car moved before or after the shot, and the nature of the physical struggle — unresolved and disputed. Therefore, Crane's account, that Roper shot an unarmed Crane while he was in a chokehold in a parked car before it moved, must be accepted for purposes of summary judgment. Applying the 'objective reasonableness' standard from Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor, the court evaluated the three factors: 1) severity of the crime, 2) threat to officer or others, and 3) active resistance or attempt to evade arrest. Under Crane's account, Roper's use of deadly force was unreasonable. First, Crane was unarmed and held in a chokehold in a parked car, and the other officers were not in immediate danger, meaning the car did not pose a serious threat until after Crane was shot. Second, Crane's warrants were for misdemeanors and an unconfirmed felony violation, not severe enough to warrant deadly force when other officers did not escalate to such an extent. Third, while Crane was non-compliant with arrest, under his account, he was shot as he attempted to comply with an order to turn off the car, not while actively fleeing or posing a threat. Thus, all three Graham factors favored Crane. Furthermore, the court found that the constitutional right violated was clearly established. Precedent had long made it clear that deadly force is unreasonable against an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect who does not pose a sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others, whether fleeing on foot or in a vehicle. A reasonable officer would have known that using deadly force on an unarmed, non-compliant driver held in a chokehold in a parked car, who was attempting to comply with an order, was a constitutional violation 'beyond debate.' Regarding the City's liability under Monell, the court vacated the summary judgment because the underlying constitutional violation by Roper was still in dispute, thus removing jurisdiction to determine the City's liability. No, passengers, as bystanders, cannot bring a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under § 1983 based on witnessing excessive force used against another, nor for an officer briefly pointing a gun at them without causing unreasonable force. The court affirmed the dismissal of the passengers' claims, explaining that witnessing excessive force is not a constitutional injury under § 1983, but rather a state tort claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. To succeed, bystanders must be the direct objects of the excessive force, not merely witnesses. Moreover, the act of pointing a gun, without more, does not typically rise to the level of a constitutional violation, especially given an officer's right to use some physical coercion or threat thereof to effect an arrest. In this case, there was no unreasonable use of force directed at the passengers, and their alleged psychological injuries from the momentary fear did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.