Cramer v. United States
1945 U.S. LEXIS 2157, 325 U.S. 1, 65 S. Ct. 918 (1945)
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Rule of Law:
The overt act required for a treason conviction must be an action that, in its setting, objectively demonstrates the actual giving of aid and comfort to the enemy, and every element of such an act must be supported by the direct testimony of two witnesses.
Facts:
- Anthony Cramer, a German by birth, became a naturalized United States citizen in 1936 after residing in the country since 1925.
- Cramer had known Werner Thiel, one of the German saboteurs who landed on U.S. shores in June 1942, intimately since 1929; they had worked and lived together.
- Thiel, a zealous Nazi, returned to Germany in 1941, believing war between the U.S. and Germany was imminent, and Cramer corresponded with him, expressing sympathy for Germany and declining war-related work.
- In June 1942, Thiel and Edward Kerling, along with other saboteurs, landed in Florida from a German submarine as part of a mission to disrupt U.S. industry.
- Thiel left a cryptic note for Cramer, leading to a meeting between them at Grand Central Station and then the Twin Oaks Inn, where Cramer suspected Thiel had arrived by submarine on a German mission.
- At this first meeting, Cramer learned Thiel had between $3,500 and $4,000, believed to be from the German government, and offered to keep it for him, also offering to contact Thiel's fiancée, Norma Kopp.
- Cramer met Thiel and Kerling again at the Twin Oaks Inn, where they conversed for about an hour and a half before Kerling left.
- After Kerling's departure, Cramer and Thiel went to Thompson’s Cafeteria, where Thiel gave Cramer a money belt containing $3,600, from which Cramer was to take $200 Thiel owed him, keep some accessible, and deposit the rest in his safe-deposit box, which Cramer subsequently did.
Procedural Posture:
- Anthony Cramer was arrested and subsequently indicted for treason under Section 1 of the Criminal Code.
- Cramer was tried in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and found guilty by a jury.
- The trial judge sentenced Cramer to forty-five years in prison.
- Cramer appealed his conviction to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari due to conflicting positions among lower courts regarding the interpretation of the overt act requirement in treason cases, and later invited reargument on specific questions.
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Issue:
Does the Constitutional requirement that "No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act" demand that the overt act itself, as proved by two witnesses, objectively manifest the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy, or is it sufficient for the act to appear innocent on its face if coupled with other evidence of treasonable intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Jackson
No, the overt acts of merely meeting and conversing with Werner Thiel and Edward Kerling, as proved by two witnesses, were insufficient to sustain a conviction for treason. The Court reversed Cramer's conviction, holding that the Constitution's two-witness rule for an overt act requires that the act itself, in its setting, objectively manifest the actual giving of 'aid and comfort' to the enemy. This stringent requirement stems from the Framers' deep distrust of treason prosecutions and their intent to prevent convictions based on inference, circumstantial evidence, or the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, which had historically led to abuses. While treasonable intent (adherence) can be inferred from conduct and proven by other types of evidence, the act of 'giving aid and comfort' itself must be established by direct proof from two witnesses. The meetings and conversations between Cramer and the saboteurs, without direct proof of what was said or that anything of value was conveyed to aid their mission, were 'colorless' and did not, by themselves, constitute the actual rendering of aid and comfort. The Court acknowledged that other alleged acts, such as hiding Thiel's money, might have presented a different case if properly proven by two witnesses, but those specific overt acts were withdrawn from jury consideration. The Court stressed that while this interpretation makes treason convictions difficult, it aligns with the constitutional design to safeguard liberty, noting that Congress has other avenues, such as espionage laws, to punish acts detrimental to national security.
Dissenting - Douglas
Yes, the overt acts of meeting and conferring with the enemy, when considered in the full context of Cramer’s knowledge and his subsequent admissions, were sufficient to sustain a treason conviction. Justice Douglas argued that the majority's interpretation was overly restrictive and rendered the treason clause unworkable. He contended that while the overt act must be proved by two witnesses, it does not need to manifest treasonable intent on its face; rather, its treasonable character can be established by other competent evidence, including circumstantial evidence, testimony from a single witness, and crucially, the defendant’s own admissions in open court. Douglas emphasized Cramer’s background, his admitted belief that Thiel was a German saboteur on a mission to injure the United States, and his actions, such as agreeing to hide Thiel’s money and then lying to FBI agents to protect Thiel’s identity and mission. These admissions, given by Cramer under oath in open court, served to illuminate the true, treasonable significance of the meetings. To disregard these admissions, he argued, would be illogical and would ignore established legal precedent that allows a defendant’s own testimony to cure deficiencies in the prosecution’s case. The overt acts, when understood in light of Cramer’s own words, clearly demonstrated that his treasonous intent had moved from thought into action, thereby satisfying the constitutional requirement.
Analysis:
This case is a foundational precedent for interpreting the Treason Clause, particularly its strict 'overt act' and 'two-witness' requirements. It establishes a high burden of proof for the prosecution, demanding direct, unambiguous evidence of an act that objectively constitutes giving aid and comfort to the enemy, rather than relying on inference from commonplace actions or even a defendant's general disloyalty. The ruling reinforces the constitutional framers' intent to narrowly define treason and protect against its historical abuse as a political tool, even at the cost of making convictions difficult in wartime. The case implicitly encourages Congress to legislate specific offenses like espionage, sabotage, or harboring enemies, which can be prosecuted with less stringent evidentiary standards than treason, to address modern national security threats.
