Craig v. Harney
67 S. Ct. 1249, 331 U.S. 367, 1947 U.S. LEXIS 2266 (1947)
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Rule of Law:
Punishing out-of-court publications for contempt of court violates the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and press unless the utterances create a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. The danger must be an imminent, not merely a likely or probable, threat that immediately imperils the fair and orderly functioning of the judicial process.
Facts:
- In a forcible detainer case, Jackson v. Mayes, County Judge Joe D. Browning, a layman, presided over a dispute concerning possession of a business building.
- At the close of testimony, Judge Browning instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff, Jackson.
- The jury refused to comply and twice returned a verdict for the defendant, Mayes, a serviceman.
- Judge Browning repeatedly refused to accept the jury's verdict, and the jury finally complied, stating it did so under coercion from the court and against its conscience.
- While a motion for a new trial filed by Mayes was pending, newspapers with which the petitioners were associated published news stories and an editorial.
- The publications characterized the judge's actions as a 'travesty on justice' and 'high handed,' criticized him for being a layman, and reported that public opinion was 'outraged' that a serviceman was getting a 'raw deal'.
Procedural Posture:
- An officer of the County Court of Nueces County, Texas filed a complaint charging the petitioners with contempt by publication.
- The County Court, a trial court, adjudged the petitioners guilty of constructive criminal contempt and sentenced them to three days in jail.
- Petitioners applied to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state's highest criminal court, for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge their confinement.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the writ and remanded the petitioners to custody, thereby upholding the contempt conviction.
- The petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, which the Court granted.
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Issue:
Does holding newspaper publishers in contempt for publishing articles and an editorial that strongly criticize a judge's handling of a pending case violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes. Holding the newspaper staff in contempt violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The publications, while using strong and intemperate language, did not create a 'clear and present danger' to the administration of justice. The news articles were reports on a public event, and inaccuracies in reporting are not grounds for contempt. The editorial criticized the judge's procedure and his qualifications as a layman, which is legitimate commentary, especially for an elected official. The law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be sensitive to public opinion; judges are supposed to be 'men of fortitude' able to withstand criticism. The publications did not pose an imminent, serious threat to the court's ability to give fair consideration to the pending motion for a new trial.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Murphy
Yes. The contempt convictions are unconstitutional. The First Amendment forbids a judge from summarily punishing a newspaper for an unjust attack, with the only possible exception being the rare instance where the attack might cause a 'real impediment to the administration of justice.' Using summary contempt power to suppress criticism poses a grave threat to freedom of the press. Judges must rely on 'silence and a steady devotion to duty' as their best answer to irresponsible criticism, not retaliatory punishment that chills free speech.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
No. The contempt convictions do not violate the Constitution and should be affirmed. The Texas court found that the series of publications was intended to 'force, compel, and coerce' the judge into granting a new trial and that they constituted a 'clear and present danger' of achieving that end. The Supreme Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the state court, which was in a better position to understand the local context and the publications' impact. The articles were not general criticism but a targeted campaign to influence the outcome of a pending matter, an evil which the states have a constitutional right to prevent through contempt proceedings.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Jackson
No. The contempt convictions should be upheld. The right to a fair trial, free from outside pressures, is as vital as the right to a free press, and this publisher infringed upon that right. The newspaper's one-sided and unfair attacks put the judge in an impossible position: either appear to yield to public clamor or defy it, both of which distract from the calm consideration of the case. The majority's opinion sponsors the 'myth' that judges are immune to public pressure, which is an 'ill-founded' and dangerous assumption, particularly for an elected, non-lawyer judge with no life tenure.
Analysis:
This decision solidified the 'clear and present danger' test as the stringent standard for contempt-by-publication cases, making it extremely difficult for courts to punish out-of-court commentary. By emphasizing that judges must have 'fortitude' and tolerate even unfair and intemperate criticism, the Court significantly strengthened First Amendment protections for the press when reporting on the judiciary. The ruling establishes a high bar for what constitutes an impermissible threat to the administration of justice, effectively shielding all but the most extreme and direct efforts to influence a pending case from contempt proceedings. This case signals that the balance between a free press and a fair trial heavily favors the press, short of a direct and imminent threat.
