Cox v. The May Department Store Company
183 Ariz. 361, 903 P.2d 1119 (1995)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Arizona's comparative negligence framework, a plaintiff may invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without proving they were free from any contributing fault. The 'exclusive control' element of the doctrine refers to the defendant's control over the instrumentality that caused the injury (e.g., an escalator's maintenance and operation), not the plaintiff's use of it at the time of the accident.
Facts:
- May Department Store Company owned a Robinson's Department Store and contracted with Montgomery Elevator Company to maintain the store's escalator.
- On December 29, 1990, Janelle Cox was ascending the escalator in a normal fashion while wearing an ordinary jacket.
- Cox’s jacket became lodged between the escalator’s moving handrail and its stationary guide.
- This caused Cox to be thrown down and dragged to the top of the escalator, resulting in physical injuries.
- Prior to the accident, Cox had noticed nothing unusual about the escalator's operation and did not see how her jacket became caught.
- An inspection by Montgomery Elevator Company eleven days prior to the accident found that no maintenance was required.
- The City of Phoenix had also inspected the escalator four months before the incident and found no problems or defects.
Procedural Posture:
- Janelle and David Preston Cox filed a complaint against May Department Store Company and Montgomery Elevator Company in an Arizona trial court, alleging negligence.
- The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiffs had no evidence of negligence and that res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
- The trial court ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply because the plaintiffs failed to establish the element of 'exclusive control.'
- The Coxes, as appellants, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Court of Appeals of Arizona.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply to an escalator accident where the plaintiff cannot prove a specific defect, the defendants were responsible for the escalator's maintenance, and Arizona has adopted a comparative negligence system?
Opinions:
Majority - Weisberg, Judge.
Yes, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies under these circumstances. To survive summary judgment using this doctrine, a plaintiff can rely on circumstantial evidence to allow a jury to infer negligence without direct proof of a specific negligent act. The court found that the first element was met because an escalator catching a person's jacket is an event that ordinarily does not occur absent negligence, a conclusion a jury could reach through common knowledge or expert testimony. The court rejected the trial court's reasoning on the second element, 'exclusive control,' holding that the relevant instrumentality was the escalator, not the plaintiff's jacket. Since the defendants had exclusive control over the escalator's design, installation, and maintenance, this element was satisfied. Most significantly, the court abrogated the third traditional element—that the accident was not due to the plaintiff's voluntary action. It reasoned that retaining this element, which is rooted in the old doctrine of contributory negligence, would directly contravene the purpose of Arizona's comparative negligence statute, which seeks to apportion fault rather than bar recovery entirely. Finally, the fourth element was met because the plaintiff was not in a position to show the particular mechanical defect that caused the accident.
Analysis:
This case is significant for modernizing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Arizona by harmonizing it with the principles of comparative negligence. By explicitly eliminating the requirement that a plaintiff be completely free from fault, the court prevents the doctrine from acting as an all-or-nothing bar to recovery, which would contradict the legislative intent of the state's comparative fault system. Furthermore, the court's interpretation of 'exclusive control' clarifies its application to instrumentalities, like escalators, that are intended for public use. This decision broadens the path for plaintiffs injured by complex machinery in public accommodations to reach a jury, even when they cannot pinpoint the precise mechanical failure or negligent act.
