Cox v. Director of Revenue
2003 Mo. LEXIS 32, 98 S.W.3d 548, 2003 WL 723288 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
Under Missouri law, a person is considered to be "operating" a motor vehicle if they cause the vehicle's engine to function, even if the vehicle is stationary. Sitting behind the steering wheel of a running vehicle is sufficient to constitute operation for the purpose of a driver's license suspension for driving while intoxicated.
Facts:
- On the night of August 15, 1998, a police officer discovered Steven R. Cox sleeping or unconscious in the driver's seat of a vehicle in a gas station parking lot.
- Cox was the only person in the vehicle.
- The keys were in the ignition, the engine was running, and the gear shift lever was in the 'park' position.
- When awakened by the officer, Cox exhibited signs of intoxication, including a strong odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and disorientation.
- Cox failed field sobriety tests.
- After his arrest and receiving Miranda warnings, Cox answered 'Yes' to the question, 'Were you operating the vehicle?'.
- A subsequent breath test revealed Cox had a blood alcohol content of .18 of one percent.
Procedural Posture:
- The Director of Revenue suspended Steven R. Cox’s driving privileges.
- Cox requested a trial de novo in the circuit court.
- The circuit court, as the trial court, found that the Director of Revenue had improperly suspended Cox's license and ruled in favor of Cox.
- The Director of Revenue (appellant) appealed the circuit court's judgment to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
- Following a decision by the Court of Appeals, the Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer to hear the case.
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Issue:
Does sitting behind the steering wheel of a parked motor vehicle with the engine running, while intoxicated, constitute 'operating' a motor vehicle under section 577.001.1, RSMo Supp.1997?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Duane Benton
Yes. A person is 'operating' a motor vehicle if they cause it to function, which occurs when the engine is running. The plain and ordinary dictionary meaning of 'operate' is 'to cause to function.' While the legislature narrowed the DWI statute by removing the phrase 'or being in actual physical control,' it did not eliminate the distinct meanings of 'driving' and 'operating.' 'Driving' requires movement, but 'operating' only requires causing the vehicle's engine to function. Therefore, when the key is in the ignition, the engine is running, and an individual is behind the steering wheel, an officer has probable cause to believe the person is operating the vehicle, even if they are asleep or unconscious.
Dissenting - Judge Ronnie L. White
No. The majority's interpretation of 'operate' effectively nullifies the legislature's 1996 amendment that removed the 'actual physical control' standard from the statute. The legislative intent was to de-criminalize the situation where an intoxicated person sits in a motionless vehicle, even with the engine running, to avoid driving. The facts of this case—a person asleep behind the wheel of a parked, running car—are precisely what the 'actual physical control' standard covered. By defining 'operate' so broadly, the majority ignores the legislative intent to narrow the statute and renders the amendment a meaningless act.
Dissenting - Judge Michael A. Wolff
No. The law should encourage an intoxicated person not to drive. It should be permissible for someone in Cox's condition to get into their car and run the engine for heat or air-conditioning while they stay put and wait to become sober. The law is intended to prevent the danger an intoxicated driver poses to the public, not the private risk a person takes by sleeping in a running car. The majority's holding discourages the safer choice of not driving.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the legal distinction in Missouri between 'driving,' 'operating,' and the now-defunct 'actual physical control' standard for DWI offenses. The court established a bright-line rule that 'operating' is defined by causing the vehicle's engine to function, regardless of movement. This interpretation significantly limits the practical effect of the legislature's 1996 amendment, which many believed was intended to protect individuals who choose to 'sleep it off' in a running car. The ruling provides law enforcement with a clear basis for arrest in stationary vehicle situations and makes it more difficult for defendants to argue they were not 'operating' a vehicle simply because it was not in motion.
