Cowan v. Superior Court
96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8849, 14 Cal. 4th 367, 926 P.2d 438 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant may expressly waive an expired statute of limitations for a lesser offense when the waiver is knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and made for the defendant's benefit. An expired statute of limitations does not deprive a court of fundamental subject matter jurisdiction but rather constitutes an act in excess of jurisdiction, which is waivable.
Facts:
- In 1984, petitioner Gerald Thomas Cowan allegedly committed three murders.
- A complaint was filed in 1994, ten years later, charging Cowan with murder, an offense with no statute of limitations.
- The prosecution and Cowan negotiated a plea agreement where Cowan would plead no contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter, a lesser offense.
- In exchange for the plea, the murder charges would be dismissed, and Cowan would receive a maximum four-year prison sentence.
- The statute of limitations for voluntary manslaughter is six years, which had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1994.
- After entering his plea, the issue of the time-bar was raised, and Cowan personally stated his willingness to waive the statute of limitations to secure the benefit of the plea bargain.
Procedural Posture:
- A complaint was filed against petitioner in superior court charging him with three murders committed ten years prior.
- Following a preliminary hearing, petitioner entered a no contest plea to voluntary manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement.
- Before sentencing, the district attorney moved to set aside the plea, arguing it was illegal because the statute of limitations for manslaughter was a non-waivable jurisdictional bar.
- The superior court granted the motion, vacated the plea, and reinstated the original murder charges.
- Petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal to compel the superior court to accept his plea and waiver.
- The Court of Appeal denied the petition for writ of mandate.
- The California Supreme Court granted review.
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Issue:
Does a criminal defendant have the right to expressly waive an expired statute of limitations for a lesser offense as part of a plea agreement to avoid prosecution for a more serious, non-time-barred offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Chin, J.
Yes, a criminal defendant has the right to expressly waive an expired statute of limitations for a lesser offense as part of a plea agreement. This decision re-characterizes the statute of limitations in criminal cases, shifting from the long-standing view that it is a fundamental jurisdictional bar to a view that it is a waivable right when a court acts in excess of its jurisdiction. The court distinguishes its prior holdings, which involved forfeiture (the failure to assert a right), from this case, which involves an express waiver (the intentional relinquishment of a known right). Because the trial court had fundamental subject matter jurisdiction over the non-time-barred murder charge, it had the power to accept a plea to a time-barred lesser offense if the defendant validly waived the time bar for his own benefit. The court overrules the language in People v. McGee and its progeny to the extent they suggest a court lacks fundamental subject matter jurisdiction over a time-barred criminal action.
Concurring - Baxter, J.
Yes, a defendant should be able to expressly waive the statute of limitations for a lesser offense under the conditions outlined by the majority. This concurrence emphasizes the narrowness of the majority's holding. The opinion explicitly notes that it joins the majority because the court correctly refrains from deciding the broader question of whether the statute of limitations should be treated as an affirmative defense that can be forfeited by a defendant's failure to raise it. That question is left for a future case.
Concurring - Chin, J.
Yes, but it is important to stop at express waiver and not adopt a forfeiture rule as the dissent advocates. This separate concurrence, written by the majority's author, argues against the dissent's proposal to treat the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense subject to forfeiture. Citing stare decisis and policy reasons, the opinion argues that a forfeiture rule would unfairly harm defendants who are unaware of the time bar and would lead to a flood of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which are difficult to litigate on a silent record. Requiring an express waiver ensures the defendant's decision is knowing and creates a clear record, protecting both the defendant and the finality of the judgment.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Brown, J.
Yes, the petitioner should be allowed to enter his plea, but the court's reasoning does not go far enough. This opinion concurs with the judgment but dissents from the majority's limited rationale, arguing that the court should completely abandon the jurisdictional approach from People v. McGee. It contends that the statute of limitations should be treated as an affirmative defense that is forfeited if not timely raised by the defendant. This 'forfeiture rule' would align California with the vast majority of state and federal courts, promote judicial efficiency by requiring the issue to be litigated at the trial level, and prevent the gamesmanship that can occur when a defendant strategically remains silent about a time-barred lesser offense instruction.
Analysis:
This decision significantly alters over 60 years of California precedent by reclassifying the criminal statute of limitations from a non-waivable, fundamental jurisdictional bar to a right that a defendant can expressly waive. It provides crucial flexibility in plea negotiations, allowing defendants to plead to time-barred lesser offenses to avoid the risk of conviction on more serious charges. The ruling creates a clear procedure for such waivers but intentionally leaves unresolved the broader question of whether the statute of limitations can be forfeited through inaction, setting the stage for future litigation on that issue.
