Coursey v. Westvaco Corp.
1990 WL 68122, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 132, 790 S.W.2d 229 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
Under Kentucky's recreational use statute, a landowner is shielded from liability under the common law attractive nuisance doctrine for injuries to children if the landowner knew of and condoned the public's recreational use of their property, and it can be reasonably inferred they intended to permit such use.
Facts:
- Westvaco owned a piece of property that contained a water-filled sand pit.
- In 1981, Ray Coursey, who was 13 years old, went to the property.
- Coursey dove into the water-filled sand pit.
- He struck his head on the bottom of the pit, which resulted in immediate paralysis.
- As a result of the injury, Coursey became a quadriplegic.
Procedural Posture:
- Ray Coursey sued Westvaco for negligence in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.
- Westvaco filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting immunity from liability under Kentucky's recreational use statute, KRS 411.190.
- Finding no controlling state precedent on the interpretation of the statute, the U.S. District Court certified three questions of law to the Kentucky Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does Kentucky's recreational use statute, KRS 411.190, preclude the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine to shield a landowner from liability for injuries to a child trespasser?
Opinions:
Majority - Wintersheimer, J.
Yes, KRS 411.190 precludes the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine. The statute's language is absolute and unqualified, stating an owner has 'no duty of care to keep the premises safe' for recreational users. The legislature made no specific exception for children or the attractive nuisance doctrine. Had the General Assembly intended to preserve this common law doctrine within the context of the statute, it would have explicitly done so, as legislatures in other states have. Furthermore, this court's tendency is to restrict, not enlarge, the attractive nuisance doctrine. The statute's protection is not automatic, however; a landowner must demonstrate that they knew and condoned the public making recreational use of the property, from which an intent to permit such use can be reasonably inferred.
Dissenting - Leibson, J.
No, KRS 411.190 does not preclude the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine. The attractive nuisance doctrine is a long-standing humanitarian principle of common law designed to protect children from foreseeable and unreasonable risks, and there is no reason to believe the legislature intended to silently abandon it. The statute effectively changes a recreational user's status to that of a licensee but then reverts the duty owed back to that of a trespasser. Since a trespassing child is entitled to the protection of the attractive nuisance doctrine, it defies reason and logic to provide a child with less protection simply because a landowner has encouraged their recreational use of the land.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limits landowner liability for injuries to children on lands made available for public recreation, effectively prioritizing the statutory goal of encouraging public access over the common law's special protections for children. By holding that the recreational use statute abrogates the attractive nuisance doctrine, the court places a higher burden on injured child plaintiffs, who must now prove the landowner's conduct was willful or malicious rather than merely negligent. The decision also establishes a clear standard for landowners seeking the statute's protection, requiring more than passive acquiescence; they must know of and implicitly permit the public's use. This ruling forces a re-evaluation of landowner duties in Kentucky and may influence interpretations of similar statutes in other jurisdictions.
