County of Washington v. Gunther

Supreme Court of the United States
68 L. Ed. 2d 751, 452 U.S. 161, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4 (1981)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964's prohibition on sex-based wage discrimination is not limited to claims of unequal pay for equal work. A claim of intentional sex discrimination in compensation is actionable under Title VII even if the plaintiff does not perform a job substantially equal to that of a higher-paid employee of the opposite sex.


Facts:

  • County of Washington, Oregon, employed female guards to oversee female prisoners in a separate section of its jail and male guards to oversee male prisoners.
  • The County paid its female guards substantially lower wages than its male guards.
  • The County commissioned an outside firm to conduct a survey to evaluate the relative worth of the male and female guard positions.
  • This survey concluded that the female guards' jobs were worth approximately 95% of the male guards' jobs.
  • Despite this evaluation, the County set the pay scale for female guards at about 70% of the male guards' pay, while it paid the male guards the full evaluated worth of their positions.
  • In January 1974, the County eliminated the female section of the jail, transferred the female inmates, and discharged the female guards.

Procedural Posture:

  • Four female guards sued the County of Washington in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon under Title VII, alleging unequal pay for equal work and, alternatively, intentional sex discrimination.
  • The District Court held that the guards' jobs were not substantially equal to those of the male guards and dismissed the equal-work claim.
  • The District Court also dismissed the intentional discrimination claim, ruling as a matter of law that a Title VII sex-based wage claim is limited by the Equal Pay Act's "equal work" standard.
  • The female guards (appellants) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
  • The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the equal-work claim but reversed the dismissal of the intentional discrimination claim, holding that Title VII is broader than the Equal Pay Act.
  • The County of Washington (petitioner) was granted certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.

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Issue:

Does Section 703(h) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "Bennett Amendment") restrict claims of sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII to only those claims that satisfy the "equal work" standard of the Equal Pay Act of 1963?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice Brennan

No. Section 703(h) of Title VII, the Bennett Amendment, does not restrict sex-based wage discrimination claims to the "equal work" standard of the Equal Pay Act. The Bennett Amendment merely incorporates the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. The Court reasoned that the Amendment's language, which exempts wage differentials "authorized" by the Equal Pay Act, refers only to the Act’s four affirmative defenses (seniority system, merit system, quantity/quality of production system, or any other factor other than sex), as these are the only provisions that affirmatively permit a pay differential. Interpreting the Amendment to incorporate the "equal work" standard would create a large loophole in Title VII, allowing employers to openly discriminate in compensation for unique jobs or in sex-segregated workplaces. Such a result would conflict with Title VII's broad remedial purpose to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment based on sex.


Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist

Yes. A claim of sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII is not viable unless the plaintiff first establishes that she performed "equal or substantially equal work" to that of higher-paid males. The dissent argued that the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act shows Congress deliberately chose the narrow "equal work" standard and rejected a broader "comparable worth" theory. It defies logic to assume Congress silently abandoned this carefully considered standard just one year later when enacting Title VII. The principle of in pari materia suggests the more specific Equal Pay Act should govern. The purpose of the Bennett Amendment, as explained by its sponsors, was to ensure Title VII did not "nullify" the Equal Pay Act by allowing broader claims, thus incorporating the equal work standard into Title VII. The majority's interpretation renders the Bennett Amendment largely superfluous, as Title VII already contained similar defenses.



Analysis:

This decision significantly broadened the scope of sex-based wage discrimination claims under Title VII by delinking them from the strict "equal work" standard of the Equal Pay Act. It created a cause of action for intentional wage discrimination even where no male counterpart performs an identical job. While the Court carefully avoided endorsing the controversial "comparable worth" theory, the ruling laid the foundation for future litigation challenging wage disparities resulting from job segregation and the historical undervaluation of jobs predominantly held by women. The case established that Title VII provides a broader, independent remedy against intentional discrimination in compensation.

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