County of Riverside v. McLaughlin
500 U.S. 44 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of the Fourth Amendment established in Gerstein v. Pugh. If an individual is held longer than 48 hours without a probable cause determination, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.
Facts:
- The County of Riverside, California, had a policy of combining probable cause determinations with arraignment procedures for individuals arrested without a warrant.
- Under County policy, which tracked a state statute, arraignments were required to occur within two days of arrest.
- This two-day calculation, however, excluded weekends and holidays.
- As a result of this policy, an individual arrested without a warrant late in the week could be held for as long as five days before receiving a probable cause determination.
- Over holiday periods, such as Thanksgiving, the potential delay could extend to seven days.
- Donald Lee McLaughlin and the other named plaintiffs were arrested without warrants in Riverside County and held in custody without receiving a prompt probable cause hearing under this policy.
Procedural Posture:
- Donald Lee McLaughlin filed a class-action lawsuit against the County of Riverside in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.
- The complaint alleged that the County's policies failed to provide prompt probable cause hearings to individuals arrested without a warrant.
- The District Court certified the class and issued a preliminary injunction requiring the County to provide probable cause determinations within 36 hours of arrest.
- The County of Riverside (appellant) appealed the injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit (appellee was McLaughlin) affirmed the District Court's order, holding that 36 hours was an appropriate timeframe to complete necessary administrative steps.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts regarding the definition of 'prompt' under Gerstein.
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Issue:
Does a county policy that combines probable cause determinations with arraignments, resulting in potential delays of up to 48 hours or more, violate the Fourth Amendment's requirement under Gerstein v. Pugh for a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following a warrantless arrest?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O’Connor
No. The Fourth Amendment does not compel an immediate determination of probable cause upon completion of administrative steps; a jurisdiction may combine the probable cause determination with other pretrial proceedings, such as arraignment, so long as the determination is made promptly. The Court established that a probable cause determination made within 48 hours of arrest is presumptively reasonable. This standard provides jurisdictions with a 'safe harbor' and avoids federal judicial oversight of local jailhouse operations. However, a hearing within 48 hours may still be unconstitutional if the delay was unreasonable, such as for the purpose of gathering additional evidence. If a hearing is not provided within 48 hours, the burden shifts to the government to show a 'bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance' justified the delay. The Court concluded that Riverside County's policy of excluding weekends and holidays from its 2-day calculation was unconstitutional because it regularly resulted in delays longer than 48 hours.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes. A probable-cause hearing is sufficiently 'prompt' under Gerstein only when it is provided immediately upon completion of the administrative steps incident to arrest. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, which required hearings to be held as soon as administrative steps were complete, should have been affirmed.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
Yes. The Fourth Amendment preserves the common-law tradition that a person arrested without a warrant must be brought before a magistrate 'as soon as he reasonably can,' with delay permissible only for completing the arrest and arranging for the magistrate. The majority's 'balancing' approach and creation of a 48-hour rule for administrative convenience is an utterly unjustified departure from this historical protection against unlawful detention. The only permissible reasons for delay are completing the administrative steps of arrest and arranging for a magistrate's presence, not piggybacking other proceedings. A 24-hour outer limit is a more appropriate and historically grounded standard.
Analysis:
This decision provides a concrete, bright-line rule for what constitutes a 'prompt' probable cause hearing under Gerstein, replacing a vague standard with a presumptively constitutional 48-hour timeframe. It establishes a burden-shifting framework that gives states a 'safe harbor' for compliance while still allowing individuals to challenge unreasonable delays. The ruling significantly impacts criminal procedure nationwide by offering clear guidance to law enforcement agencies and local governments on scheduling post-arrest proceedings. However, it also represents a departure from the stricter, common-law interpretation favored by the dissent, arguably prioritizing administrative efficiency over the swiftest possible protection of an individual's liberty.
