County of Los Angeles et al. v. Davis et al.
440 U.S. 625 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
A case is moot, and jurisdiction may abate, if it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation the alleged violation will recur and interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.
Facts:
- In 1969, the County of Los Angeles Fire Department used a written civil service exam for hiring that resulted in a disparate impact on minority applicants.
- Prior to any litigation, the County stopped using the 1969 test because it feared the test was discriminatory and it wished to increase minority representation.
- In 1971, the County devised a new hiring process involving a pass/fail written test to screen for literacy, followed by a random selection of 500 passing applicants for interviews.
- After a new test was administered in 1972, a state court action enjoined the County from using the random selection method for reasons unrelated to discrimination.
- Faced with a critical shortage of firefighters and unable to interview all passing applicants, the County proposed to expedite hiring by interviewing the top 544 scorers on the 1972 test.
- Following objections from minority representatives, the County abandoned this proposal before it was ever implemented and before the present litigation commenced.
Procedural Posture:
- In January 1973, a class of present and future black and Mexican-American applicants sued the County of Los Angeles in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging discriminatory hiring practices in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
- The District Court, finding a violation of § 1981, permanently enjoined the County from further discrimination and entered a remedial order requiring specific hiring quotas for black and Mexican-American firefighters.
- The County of Los Angeles appealed the District Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 1969 test but affirmed the District Court's finding that the proposed 1972 plan was discriminatory and upheld the remedial hiring order.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the County's practices violated § 1981 and whether the quota remedy was appropriate.
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Issue:
Is a case challenging a county's proposed use of a written examination for hiring purposes moot when the county abandoned the proposal before implementation, has not used a similar practice for years, and has since adopted a new, effective hiring procedure that has remedied any alleged discriminatory effects?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
Yes. This controversy has become moot because the issues are no longer live and the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. The Court applies a two-part test for mootness following a voluntary cessation of challenged conduct. First, there is no reasonable expectation that the County will resume its challenged 1972 plan, as it was a response to a unique emergency that is unlikely to recur, and the County has since successfully instituted a new, non-random hiring method that significantly increased minority hiring. Second, any discriminatory effects of the never-implemented 1972 proposal have been completely eradicated by the County's subsequent hiring of over 50% of new recruits from minority groups for five consecutive years under the District Court's decree. Since both conditions for mootness are satisfied, the case must be dismissed.
Dissenting - Justice Stewart
No. The controversy is not moot, but the Court should not decide the § 1981 question. The respondents have standing to challenge the threatened use of the 1972 test, so a live controversy remains. However, the Court of Appeals' judgment was also based on a violation of Title VII, a ruling the petitioners did not challenge before the Supreme Court. Therefore, any opinion on the § 1981 issue would be advisory and would not affect the judgment that the County's conduct was illegal. The proper disposition is to vacate the judgment and remand for the District Court to substantially narrow the remedy, as the sweeping hiring quota is not justified by the single, threatened violation that remains in the case.
Dissenting - Justice Powell
No. The case is not moot and the Court misapplies settled mootness principles. A defendant's voluntary cessation of illegal conduct, especially when done under the compulsion of a court order, does not moot a case. The County has not met its 'heavy burden' of demonstrating that there is no reasonable expectation it will return to its old ways once the injunction is lifted. The County's current hiring practices are a direct product of the court order, not a voluntary change of heart. By dismissing the case, the Court avoids resolving the important and unresolved question of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires proof of discriminatory intent.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the 'voluntary cessation' exception to the mootness doctrine in the context of employment discrimination. It establishes that a combination of long-term compliance with a new, effective remedial practice and the complete eradication of the challenged practice's effects can be sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of proving mootness. This provides a potential pathway for defendants to terminate litigation by demonstrating profound and lasting changes. However, the dissents strongly critique this application, arguing it allows defendants to evade definitive rulings on the legality of their conduct by changing their practices only when under the pressure of a lawsuit, leaving the underlying legal questions unresolved.
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