Cottrell v. Smith
299 Ga. 517, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 473, 788 S.E.2d 772 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
For a limited-purpose public figure to prevail on a defamation claim, they must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the false and defamatory statements were published with actual malice, meaning the defendant knew the statements were false or acted with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. A confidential relationship giving rise to a fiduciary duty does not arise merely from a romantic relationship or general business dealings, and invasion of privacy based on public disclosure of private facts requires the disclosed facts to be truly private, secluded, or secret.
Facts:
- Stanley W. Cottrell, Jr. (Cottrell) engaged in numerous solo running exhibitions with a Christian evangelical emphasis and was involved in various multi-level marketing endeavors, executive leadership positions, and motivational speaking.
- Cottrell's public notoriety grew alongside media controversy relating to his character, questioning the authenticity and integrity of his claims and achievements.
- Glenn and Marian Crocker (Crockers) worked for Cottrell, planning two running exhibitions.
- Hugh Johnson (Johnson) was a long-time friend of Cottrell’s who came to know some women with whom Cottrell was involved outside of his marriage.
- Peggy Smith (Peggy) had an extra-marital affair with Cottrell.
- Karen Smith (Karen), Peggy’s daughter-in-law, located and contacted several people she believed had information about Cottrell, including the Crockers and Johnson.
- Karen and her husband created a “WordPress” blog (the “Blog”) and posted stories based on this information, which portrayed Cottrell as having a long history of misrepresentation and deception for personal gain.
- Karen sent emails to a “list serve” group criticizing Cottrell and sharing links to the Blog posts, and Peggy sent messages to multiple Cottrell Facebook “friends” along the same lines.
Procedural Posture:
- Stanley W. Cottrell, Jr. (Cottrell) filed suit in the superior court, alleging a conspiracy, defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with business opportunities, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act (GCSPA) against Glenn and Marian Crocker, Hugh Johnson, Peggy Smith, and Karen Smith.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial in the superior court.
- At the conclusion of Cottrell's case-in-chief, the superior court directed verdicts in favor of Defendants on the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of the GCSPA.
- The superior court allowed the remaining claims (defamation, tortious interference, invasion of privacy, breach of fiduciary duty) to go to the jury, indicating it would consider judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) if necessary.
- The jury returned verdicts: in favor of Cottrell against Peggy and Karen on the defamation claim; in favor of Defendants on the claim of tortious interference with business opportunities; in favor of Cottrell against Defendants on the claim of invasion of privacy; and in favor of Cottrell against Peggy and the Crockers on the claim of breach of fiduciary duty.
- The jury awarded Cottrell general damages ($200,000), punitive damages ($150,000), and litigation expenses/attorney fees ($285,000), totaling $635,000, which was apportioned among the defendants.
- Judgment was entered accordingly.
- Karen, Peggy, and Johnson filed post-trial motions for JNOV, and in the alternative, for a new trial.
- The superior court granted JNOV and vacated the judgment entered on the jury’s verdicts.
- Cottrell appealed the grant of JNOV and the earlier grants of directed verdicts to the Supreme Court of Georgia, with Cottrell as the appellant and the Defendants as the appellees.
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Issue:
1. Did the superior court err in directing verdicts for defendants on claims of violation of the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act (GCSPA) and intentional infliction of emotional distress due to insufficient evidence? 2. Did the superior court err in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the defamation claim, where the plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure, by finding a lack of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice regarding online posts and communications about his character and professional conduct? 3. Did the superior court err in granting JNOV on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, finding that the defendants (a paramour and business associates) did not owe the plaintiff a fiduciary duty under Georgia law? 4. Did the superior court err in granting JNOV on the invasion of privacy claim (public disclosure of embarrassing private facts), given that the disclosed facts about the plaintiff's extra-marital affairs and running records were not private?
Opinions:
Majority - Hines, Presiding Justice
Yes, the superior court correctly directed verdicts on the GCSPA and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, and properly granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the defamation, breach of fiduciary duty, and invasion of privacy claims. The court found no evidence of the specific criminal intent required for the GCSPA violations, and the defendants' conduct did not meet the 'extreme and outrageous' standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the defamation claims, Cottrell was a limited-purpose public figure, and the evidence failed to show by clear and convincing proof that defendants acted with actual malice, as many statements were opinion, true, or believed to be true after reasonable inquiry. Regarding breach of fiduciary duty, a confidential relationship was not established with Peggy or the Crockers as a matter of law. Finally, the information disclosed for the invasion of privacy claim was not private, having been publicly shared or known previously. The court determined that Cottrell was a limited-purpose public figure regarding his running and Christian evangelism, meaning the 'actual malice' standard applied to the defamation claims. This required clear and convincing evidence that defendants published statements knowing them to be false or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. For the 'Resnick' blog post, the court found Karen had credible reasons to believe Resnick's account, including direct communication with him, and therefore lacked actual malice. Other blog posts and emails were deemed opinion, substantially true (e.g., Cottrell's admitted affairs, questions about his runs), or lacked evidence of actual malice. The court reiterated that truth is a complete defense to defamation. Concerning breach of fiduciary duty, the court clarified that a romantic relationship (with Peggy) or general business dealings (with the Crockers) do not automatically create a confidential relationship under OCGA § 23-2-58 unless one party exercises controlling influence or the relationship by nature requires utmost good faith. Cottrell failed to establish such a relationship. For invasion of privacy based on public disclosure of private facts, the court found the information regarding Cottrell's affairs and running records was not 'private, secluded or secret,' as Cottrell and his paramours had openly acknowledged their relationships, and discussions about his running achievements were already public. Therefore, a JNOV was warranted across all challenged claims.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the high evidentiary bar for defamation claims involving public figures in Georgia, emphasizing the stringent 'clear and convincing' standard for proving actual malice. It reinforces that opinions, even harsh ones, are generally not actionable, and that thorough investigation by a publisher, even if the information later proves incorrect, can negate a finding of reckless disregard. The ruling also narrowly construes confidential relationships for fiduciary duty claims, indicating that general trust or romantic involvement is insufficient to create such a duty. Furthermore, it sets a strict standard for invasion of privacy claims, affirming that information already in the public domain or voluntarily disclosed by the plaintiff cannot form the basis of a 'public disclosure of private facts' claim.
