Corrigan v. Buckley
55 App. D.C. 30, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 3488, 299 F. 899 (1924)
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Rule of Law:
Private agreements, such as racially restrictive covenants, are not considered state action and therefore are not prohibited by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts:
- Irene Corrigan, John J. Buckley, and 28 other white property owners in a Washington, D.C. neighborhood mutually executed a restrictive covenant.
- The covenant, dated June 1, 1921, stipulated that for a period of 21 years, no part of their land could be sold, leased, or given to any person of the "negro race or blood."
- This covenant was officially recorded in the land records of the District of Columbia, making it a binding condition on the properties.
- Subsequent to the agreement, Irene Corrigan entered into a contract to sell her covenanted property to Helen Curtis.
- Helen Curtis was a Black woman.
- Before entering the contract, Curtis was aware of the existence and terms of the racially restrictive covenant on the property.
Procedural Posture:
- John J. Buckley sued Irene Corrigan and Helen Curtis in the trial court for the District of Columbia.
- Buckley sought an injunction to prevent Corrigan from conveying her property to Curtis in violation of the restrictive covenant.
- Defendant Curtis filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the covenant was constitutionally void.
- The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
- The defendants elected to stand on their motion rather than proceed with the case.
- The trial court entered a final decree of injunction against the defendants, enforcing the covenant.
- Corrigan and Curtis, as appellants, appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
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Issue:
Does a private covenant between property owners that prohibits the sale of property to Black individuals violate the protections of the U.S. Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Van Orsdel, J.
No, a private covenant between property owners that prohibits the sale of property to Black individuals does not violate the U.S. Constitution. The constitutional prohibitions against discrimination apply only to state action, not to the private actions or agreements of individuals. The constitutional right to acquire property does not create a power to compel a private citizen to sell their property to any particular person. Because this covenant is a private contract among individuals regarding the use of their own property, it falls outside the scope of constitutional amendments, such as the Fifth and Fourteenth, which are directed at restraining government power, not private conduct.
Analysis:
This decision solidified the "state action" doctrine as a major barrier to challenging private racial discrimination. By deeming racially restrictive covenants to be private contracts beyond the reach of the Constitution, the court provided a legal foundation for widespread housing segregation. This ruling empowered private citizens to use property law to enforce racial exclusion, a practice that remained legally protected until the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), which held that judicial enforcement of such covenants did constitute state action.
