Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko
534 U.S. 61, 151 L. Ed. 2d 456, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10812 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
The implied private right of action for constitutional violations first recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents does not extend to private corporate entities acting under color of federal law.
Facts:
- Correctional Services Corporation (CSC), a private company, operated the Le Marquis Community Correctional Center, a halfway house, under a contract with the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP).
- John E. Malesko, a federal inmate with a diagnosed heart condition, was transferred to Le Marquis to serve the remainder of his sentence.
- Malesko's heart condition limited his ability to climb stairs, and he was supposed to be exempt from a CSC policy that required inmates on lower floors to use the stairs instead of the elevator.
- On March 28, 1994, a CSC employee, Jorge Urena, allegedly prohibited Malesko from using the elevator to get to his fifth-floor room.
- Malesko protested, explaining he was exempt due to his heart condition, but Urena insisted.
- Forced to climb the stairs, Malesko suffered a heart attack, fell, and sustained injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- John E. Malesko filed a lawsuit against Correctional Services Corporation (CSC) and unnamed employees in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which was treated as a Bivens claim.
- The District Court dismissed the complaint against CSC, ruling that a Bivens action could not be brought against a corporate entity.
- The District Court also dismissed the claims against the individual employees as barred by the statute of limitations.
- Malesko, as appellant, appealed the dismissal of his claim against CSC to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that Bivens liability could be extended to private corporations acting under color of federal law.
- Correctional Services Corporation, as petitioner, successfully sought a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the implied private right of action for damages against federal officers for constitutional violations, first recognized in Bivens, extend to a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the federal Bureau of Prisons?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No. The implied private right of action recognized in Bivens does not extend to private corporate entities acting under contract with the federal government. The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations, not to hold entities liable. Extending liability to a corporate defendant would undermine this core purpose, as plaintiffs would sue the deeper-pocketed corporation instead of the individual officer, thus losing the deterrent effect on the individual wrongdoer. This reasoning follows the Court's decision in FDIC v. Meyer, which refused to extend Bivens to federal agencies. Furthermore, the Court has consistently hesitated to extend Bivens to new contexts, particularly when, as here, alternative remedies like state tort actions are available to the plaintiff. Unlike the plaintiffs in Bivens or Davis, Malesko was not in a 'damages or nothing' situation.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The Bivens remedy should apply to a private corporation employed by the federal government to perform federal functions. This is not an 'extension' of Bivens but a straightforward application, as a corporate agent should be treated no differently than an individual agent. The majority's deterrence rationale is flawed; suing corporations, which are subject to market pressures, is an effective deterrent against unconstitutional policies and actions. The Court's decision creates an illogical asymmetry where state prisoners in private facilities can sue the corporation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but federal prisoners in identical circumstances are denied a remedy. This holding is driven by a disagreement with the Bivens precedent itself, which Congress has effectively ratified and the Court should respect.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No. While agreeing with the majority's conclusion, the concurrence argues that Bivens itself is a 'relic of the heady days' when the Court improperly created causes of action not specified by Congress. The practice of implying private rights of action has been abandoned in the statutory context and should be abandoned in the constitutional context as well. Therefore, Bivens and its progeny should be strictly limited to their precise factual circumstances and never extended to any new context.
Analysis:
This decision significantly curtails the expansion of Bivens remedies by establishing a clear precedent against holding private corporate federal contractors liable for constitutional torts. It reinforces the Court's modern trend of judicial restraint in implying causes of action from the Constitution, emphasizing that such policy decisions are better left to Congress. The ruling creates a notable disparity, as state prisoners in private facilities may sue corporations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while federal prisoners in similar facilities have no such remedy against the corporation itself. The case solidifies the interpretation that Bivens's primary purpose is deterring individual officer misconduct, not providing broad remedies for constitutional harms or deterring institutional actors.
