Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors
603 U.S. 799 (2024)
Rule of Law:
The 6-year statute of limitations for civil actions against the United States, codified in 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a), does not begin to run until the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, which is when they are injured by final agency action.
Facts:
- In 2010, Congress enacted the Durbin Amendment, tasking the Federal Reserve Board with ensuring interchange fees paid by merchants were "reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction."
- In 2011, the Federal Reserve Board published Regulation II, which sets a maximum interchange fee of $0.21 per transaction plus 0.05% of the transaction's value.
- Petitioner Corner Post, a truckstop and convenience store in Watford City, North Dakota, was incorporated in 2017 and opened for business in 2018.
- Since opening, Corner Post has accepted debit cards as a form of payment and, like most merchants, has paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in interchange fees set by payment networks under Regulation II.
- Corner Post believed Regulation II allowed payment networks to charge unreasonably high fees, which negatively impacted its business operations.
Procedural Posture:
- In 2011, a group of retail-industry trade associations and individual retailers sued the Board in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging Regulation II.
- The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed this decision, upholding Regulation II.
- In 2021, Corner Post joined a new suit against the Board in the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota, challenging Regulation II under the Administrative Procedure Act.
- The District Court dismissed Corner Post's suit as time-barred under 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a), holding the 6-year limitations period began in 2011 upon Regulation II's publication and expired in 2017, before Corner Post opened.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal, with Corner Post as appellant and the Board as appellee, distinguishing between "facial" challenges (like Corner Post's) and "as-applied" challenges, stating facial challenges accrue upon publication of the regulation.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over when § 2401(a)'s statute of limitations begins for APA suits challenging agency action.
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Issue:
Does an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim, for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a)'s 6-year statute of limitations, accrue when final agency action is taken, or when the plaintiff is injured by that final agency action?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Barrett
Yes, an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim, for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a)'s 6-year statute of limitations, accrues when the plaintiff is injured by final agency action. The Court reasoned that a "right of action first accrues" when the plaintiff has a "complete and present cause of action"—that is, when they have the right to "file suit and obtain relief" (citing Green v. Brennan, 578 U. S. 547, 554). An APA plaintiff cannot file suit and obtain relief until they suffer an injury from final agency action. The Court explained that in 1948, when § 2401(a) was enacted, "accrue" had a well-settled meaning: a right accrues when it comes into existence, and legal dictionaries specified that a cause of action accrues when damage is sustained, not merely when causes are set in motion. This standard accrual rule is a strong background presumption, and Congress knows how to create limitations periods that start with a defendant's action rather than a plaintiff's injury, but did not use such language in § 2401(a). The Court rejected the Board's arguments that specific statutory review provisions starting the clock at finality reflected a general administrative-law practice, noting fundamental textual differences. It also dismissed the Board's reliance on Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U. S. 58 (1926), and Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U. S. 503 (1967), distinguishing them or affirming that § 2401(a) embodies the traditional plaintiff-centric accrual rule. Finally, the Court dismissed policy concerns about administrative inconvenience and the need for finality, stating that such pleas never justify departing from clear statutory text. The Court concluded that the plaintiff-centric rule vindicates the APA's "basic presumption" of judicial review (Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140) and the "deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court" (Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U. S. 793, 798).
Concurring - Justice Kavanaugh
Justice Kavanaugh agreed with the majority that an APA claim accrues upon a plaintiff's injury. He wrote separately to emphasize a crucial additional point: Corner Post could obtain relief in this case only because the APA authorizes the vacatur of unlawful agency rules. He explained that unregulated plaintiffs, like Corner Post, often sue to challenge rules that regulate others but have adverse downstream effects on them. In such cases, an injunction barring enforcement against the plaintiff would not provide relief because the plaintiff is not regulated by the rule. He argued that the APA's text, which directs courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action" (5 U. S. C. § 706(2)), historically and currently means "vacate." He cited numerous Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedents supporting the practice of vacating agency actions and stated that eliminating vacatur would "revolutionize long-settled administrative law" by shutting the courthouse doors on entire classes of administrative litigation, including competitor suits, environmental litigation, and challenges to workplace safety standards. He rejected the Government's recent arguments that "set aside" does not mean vacatur, explaining that the APA departed from common law equitable principles by empowering courts to act directly against agency actions. He concluded that the Government's position was both novel and wrong and would fundamentally reshape administrative law.
Dissenting - Justice Jackson
No, an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim, for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a)'s 6-year statute of limitations, should accrue when the agency rule is published, particularly for facial challenges to agency regulations. Justice Jackson argued that the majority's rigid, one-size-fits-all reading of "accrues" ignores long-recognized judicial precedent that the term "accrues" is flexible and context-dependent (Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U. S. 503, 517). She emphasized that Congress has consistently expressed its intent that, in the administrative-law context, the limitations period for claims challenging agency action runs from the moment of final agency action, citing numerous pre- and post-1948 statutes. She contended that a plaintiff's injury is "utterly irrelevant" to a facial APA claim, which focuses on the agency's action and the administrative record, not what happened to a particular plaintiff. She criticized the majority's decision as effectively eliminating any limitations period for facial challenges to agency regulations, allowing new entities to perpetually challenge longstanding rules, destabilizing government and businesses, and promoting "gamesmanship" by litigants creating or finding new plaintiffs to circumvent deadlines. She warned that this, combined with other recent Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369 (2024)), would "devastate the functioning of the Federal Government" and create chaos.
Analysis:
This case significantly alters the landscape for Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenges by establishing a plaintiff-centric accrual rule for the default 6-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). The ruling potentially extends the period during which facial challenges to agency regulations can be brought, allowing parties who were not in existence or not injured at the time of a rule's promulgation to challenge it years, even decades, later. This could lead to increased litigation against long-standing regulations, potentially undermining regulatory stability and the reliance interests of regulated entities and the government, as highlighted by the dissent. Conversely, it broadens access to judicial review for entities genuinely injured by agency actions far after their initial promulgation, aligning with the APA's basic presumption of review and the principle of having one's day in court.
