Corey v. Pierce County
225 P.3d 367, 154 Wash.App. 752 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
Washington law does not recognize an independent tort cause of action for damages resulting from the negligent disclosure of unsubstantiated harmful information. While the Public Records Act provides privacy protections for such information through injunctive relief, it does not create a basis for a civil damages claim.
Facts:
- Barbara Corey, a 20-year veteran of the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (PCPA), was appointed assistant chief criminal deputy by Prosecuting Attorney Gerry Horne.
- Corey alleged that before accepting the promotion to an at-will position, Horne promised her 'just cause' termination protection, the same security she had in her prior unionized role.
- In January 2004, following a disagreement over the transfer of another prosecutor, Horne told Corey she could either resign or be fired. Corey submitted her resignation, effective in March.
- After Corey's resignation was submitted, Horne's office initiated an investigation into Corey's handling of a private donation fund for a colleague, which was found in her desk.
- By the end of February 2004, Horne was informed by his investigator that there was no viable case to pursue against Corey regarding the funds.
- On March 5 and 6, 2004, the Tacoma News Tribune published articles quoting Horne stating that Corey was subject to a 'pending criminal investigation' for mishandled money and had 'told several lies.'
- Immediately following the publication of the first article on March 5, Horne terminated Corey's employment.
Procedural Posture:
- Barbara Corey sued Gerry Horne and Pierce County in state trial court, alleging claims including defamation, false light, outrage, and wrongful termination based on promissory estoppel.
- The trial court allowed Corey to present a novel claim to the jury for 'negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated information.'
- The County moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence and post-trial, arguing against the existence of the negligence claim and challenging the sufficiency of evidence for the other claims; the trial court denied these motions.
- A jury returned a special verdict in favor of Corey on all theories, awarding her over $3 million in damages.
- Corey moved for attorney fees, which the trial court denied as untimely.
- Pierce County (the appellant) appealed the jury's verdict to the Court of Appeals of Washington.
- Corey (the appellee) cross-appealed the denial of her motion for attorney fees.
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Issue:
Does Washington law recognize a tort cause of action for negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated harmful information?
Opinions:
Majority - Appelwick, J.
No. Washington law does not support a tort cause of action for damages due to negligent disclosure of unsubstantiated information. The court reasoned that while Washington has an interest in protecting privacy, particularly concerning unsubstantiated allegations, this protection stems from the Public Records Act (PRA). The remedy provided under the PRA for an invasion of privacy is injunctive relief to prevent disclosure, not a tort action for monetary damages after disclosure has occurred. The court found no existing case law to support the creation of a new common law tort for negligence in this context and held that the trial court erred in recognizing it. However, the court also held that because the damages for the negligence claim were coextensive with the damages for the properly submitted intentional tort claims (like defamation), the jury's verdict remained unaffected.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundary between statutory privacy rights under the Public Records Act and common law torts in Washington. It firmly rejects the judicial creation of a new negligence-based tort for disseminating harmful information, thereby channeling such privacy protections into the existing statutory framework of the PRA. The court's refusal to expand tort liability signals a cautious approach to creating new duties of care, especially where intentional torts like defamation and false light already cover similar misconduct. This holding directs future litigants with similar claims away from novel negligence theories and towards either PRA injunctions or proving the higher standards of intentional torts, which require showing falsity and, for public figures, actual malice.
