Corbett v. Weisband
551 A.2d 1059 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
An initial tortfeasor is liable for subsequent injuries caused by a third party's medical negligence unless the intervening negligence is a 'superseding cause'; whether an act is so 'highly extraordinary' as to be a superseding cause is a question of fact for the jury.
Facts:
- Lucille Corbett had a long history of problems with her left knee.
- In July 1978, Dr. DeMoura performed surgery on Corbett's knee, after which she developed a post-operative infection.
- Beginning in December 1978, Dr. Weisband treated Corbett for the knee infection, which he diagnosed as chronic osteomyelitis, and in October 1980, he performed a knee fusion (arthrodesis) on her.
- In September 1981, Corbett began treatment with a third physician, Dr. Greene, who determined the fusion had failed.
- In December 1981, Dr. Greene, allegedly unaware of the chronic osteomyelitis, performed a total knee replacement on Corbett.
- Following the knee replacement, the infection worsened, and the implant was removed in April 1983.
- In July 1983, Corbett's left leg was amputated above the knee due to the uncontrollable infection.
Procedural Posture:
- Lucille Corbett filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. DeMoura and a separate action against Dr. Weisband and his orthopedic association (ROPA).
- The two actions were consolidated for a single trial in the court of first instance, which was bifurcated into liability and damages phases.
- At the close of the plaintiff's case on liability, the trial court entered a compulsory non-suit in favor of Dr. DeMoura.
- The jury returned a verdict finding Dr. Weisband and ROPA liable for negligence.
- During the damages phase, the trial judge ruled as a matter of law that Dr. Weisband was not liable for any damages related to the subsequent care provided by Dr. Greene, including the amputation.
- The jury awarded Corbett $150,000 in damages against Weisband and ROPA.
- Corbett appealed the non-suit in favor of DeMoura and the trial court's ruling limiting damages. Weisband and ROPA appealed the liability verdict against them to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Does a subsequent physician's allegedly 'gross' or 'extraordinary' negligence in treating a patient's injury constitute a superseding cause as a matter of law, thereby relieving the initial negligent physician of liability for the ultimate harm, including amputation?
Opinions:
Majority - Rowley, Judge
No. A subsequent physician's negligence does not relieve the initial tortfeasor of liability as a matter of law; the question of whether the subsequent negligence was so 'highly extraordinary' as to constitute a superseding cause is a question for the jury. The court reasoned that under established tort principles, an initial tortfeasor is liable for additional injuries resulting from the foreseeable negligence of a subsequent treating physician. An exception exists only for a 'superseding cause,' defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447 as an intervening act that is 'highly extraordinary' or not a 'normal consequence' of the situation created by the initial tortfeasor. Citing Estate of Flickinger v. Ritsky, the court held that where reasonable minds can differ on whether an intervening act was foreseeable or highly extraordinary, the issue must be decided by the jury, not the judge. The court also found that the trial judge erred in apportioning damages, as the defendant (Dr. Weisband) failed to meet the burden of providing a reasonable, non-speculative basis for dividing a single, indivisible harm like the loss of a leg.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that questions of proximate cause, specifically the doctrine of superseding cause in the context of medical malpractice, are factual determinations reserved for the jury. It establishes a high bar for a defendant to have subsequent medical negligence declared a superseding cause as a matter of law, even when other experts characterize the subsequent care as 'grossly negligent' or 'insane.' Furthermore, the case solidifies the defendant's burden of proof under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A to provide a concrete, non-speculative evidentiary basis for apportioning damages for an indivisible injury, protecting plaintiffs from having their recovery diminished by an arbitrary division of fault.
