Cope v. Scott
45 F.3d 445 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act's discretionary function exception, the government is immune from suits challenging decisions grounded in social, economic, or political policy, such as prioritizing road repairs, but is not immune from suits challenging operational-level decisions that are not based on such policy, such as the failure to adequately warn of a known, specific hazard.
Facts:
- The National Park Service maintains Beach Drive, a two-lane road in Rock Creek Park, Washington, D.C.
- Originally designed for pleasure driving, Beach Drive became a major commuter route, carrying two to three times its recommended daily traffic load.
- On a rainy evening in 1987, a southbound car driven by Roland Scott slid on a curve into the northbound lane.
- Scott's car collided with a vehicle driven by John R. Cope, who suffered neck and back injuries.
- A responding Park Service officer officially reported the pavement as a "worn polished surface" that was "slick when wet".
- An internal engineering study (1986-1988) identified this specific stretch of road as a "high accident area" that fell below "acceptable skid-resistance levels."
- The study recommended that the dangerous curves be adequately signed and repaved with a specific polish-resistant material.
- Despite the study, the Park Service listed this section of road as 33rd on a maintenance priority list of 80 sections.
Procedural Posture:
- John R. Cope sued the National Park Service (United States) for negligence in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- The government filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing its actions were protected by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
- The District Court (trial court) granted summary judgment for the government, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
- Cope, as the appellant, appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, with the United States as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act shield the government from liability for its alleged negligence in both maintaining a road surface and in failing to post adequate warning signs for known hazardous conditions?
Opinions:
Majority - Circuit Judge Tatel
Yes, as to the road maintenance claim, but No, as to the inadequate warning sign claim. The discretionary function exception shields government actions only when they are grounded in considerations of public policy. While the decision on how and when to repair the road surface is a protected policy judgment, the decision on how to warn of a specific, known hazard on a heavily used commuter road is not. Reasoning: The court applied the two-step test from United States v. Gaubert. First, it determined that no federal statute or regulation prescribed a specific course of action for either road maintenance or sign placement, meaning the Park Service's actions involved an element of choice, or discretion. Second, the court analyzed whether that discretion was the kind Congress intended to protect—one grounded in social, economic, or political policy. For the road maintenance claim, the court found the decision was protected. Prioritizing this repair among 80 other projects involved balancing the park's overall purpose, allocating limited funds, and weighing driver safety against other demands. These are classic policy judgments involving economic expediency and social wisdom that courts should not second-guess. For the warning sign claim, however, the court found the discretion was not protected. The Park Service had already made Beach Drive a major commuter route and posted numerous other signs. In this context, the decision about what type of sign to use for a known slippery spot was not a matter of broad policy like preserving scenic vistas, but a standard operational safety judgment. Failing to provide an effective warning for a known danger did not implicate the social, economic, or political concerns that the discretionary function exception is designed to shield.
Analysis:
This case provides a crucial distinction in applying the Federal Tort Claims Act's discretionary function exception, separating high-level planning from operational execution. It clarifies that the government cannot use a blanket defense of budgetary constraints or discretion to shield itself from all negligence claims. The ruling establishes that once the government has created a known hazard or allowed one to persist on a high-use public way, its decisions about providing adequate warnings are not necessarily protected policy choices. This precedent forces courts to look deeper than the mere existence of discretion, focusing instead on whether the specific decision at issue was truly 'grounded' in social, economic, or political policy, thereby limiting the exception's scope for failures in basic safety implementation.
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