Cooper v. Oklahoma
517 U.S. 348, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 2649 (1996)
Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from requiring a criminal defendant to prove their incompetence to stand trial by a clear and convincing evidence standard; rather, a preponderance of the evidence is the maximum burden a state can impose.
Facts:
- In 1989, Cooper was charged with the brutal killing of an 86-year-old man during a burglary.
- A pretrial judge initially found Cooper incompetent based on a clinical psychologist's opinion and committed him to a state mental health facility for treatment.
- Upon Cooper's release some three months later, the trial judge heard conflicting expert opinions regarding his competence, but ordered him to proceed to trial.
- One week before trial, Cooper's lead defense attorney raised concerns about his competence for a third time, noting Cooper was behaving oddly and refusing to communicate.
- On the first day of trial, Cooper's bizarre behavior, including refusing to change out of prison overalls due to feeling them 'burning' him, talking to himself and an imaginary 'spirit,' expressing fear his attorney wanted to kill him, and falling backward off a rail to avoid his attorney, prompted a further competency hearing.
- At this hearing, a third psychologist concluded Cooper was presently incompetent, but the trial judge, despite voicing uncertainty and not disputing the diagnosis, ruled that Cooper had not carried the burden of proving incompetence by clear and convincing evidence and ordered the trial to proceed.
- During the trial, Cooper did not communicate with or sit near defense counsel, remained in prison overalls through much of the proceedings, crouched in the fetal position, and talked to himself.
Procedural Posture:
- An Oklahoma jury found Cooper guilty of first-degree murder and recommended the death penalty.
- The trial court imposed the death penalty.
- The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting Cooper's argument that Oklahoma's clear and convincing evidence standard for proving incompetence violated due process.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusion regarding the clear and convincing evidence standard and due process.
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Issue:
Does a state law requiring a criminal defendant to prove their incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
Yes, a state law requiring a criminal defendant to prove their incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it offends a fundamental principle of justice and allocates too great a risk of error to the defendant. The Court reiterated that the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process, a right 'rudimentary' to a fair trial, encompassing rights like effective assistance of counsel, confronting witnesses, and the decision to testify or remain silent, as established in cases like Medina v. California, Drope v. Missouri, and Pate v. Robinson. The long-standing test for incompetence, derived from Dusky v. United States, requires a defendant to have 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and 'a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' While Medina permitted a state to presume competence and require the defendant to prove incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence, this was limited to cases where the evidence was in equipoise. Oklahoma's heightened 'clear and convincing' standard affects cases where the defendant has already demonstrated they are 'more likely than not' incompetent. Historical practice, from English common law to early American cases and modern state practices (with only 4 out of 50 states imposing such a high burden), consistently supports a preponderance standard. The clear and convincing standard imposes a significant risk of erroneously determining a truly incompetent defendant is competent, leading to severe consequences such as undermining their ability to exercise fundamental fair trial rights. Conversely, the State’s interest in avoiding feigned incompetence or delays is modest, as such errors are correctable. The Court distinguished the State's power to set procedural burdens in general (as in Patterson v. New York) from procedures guaranteeing a fundamental constitutional right. It also distinguished Addington v. Texas, which required a clear and convincing standard for involuntary civil commitment, because commitment and competency proceedings address different substantive issues and protect distinct interests (liberty versus the fundamental right not to stand trial while incompetent). Ultimately, forcing a defendant who is more likely than not incompetent to stand trial is incompatible with due process.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the fundamental right of a criminal defendant not to stand trial while incompetent, clarifying the permissible burden of proof states may impose. By striking down the clear and convincing evidence standard, the Court ensures a more robust protection for a defendant's ability to participate meaningfully in their own defense, particularly where evidence of incompetence is substantial but not overwhelming. This decision restricts states' ability to impose high evidentiary burdens in competency proceedings, aligning state practice more closely with common law traditions and the prevailing standards across most jurisdictions and federal courts. It prevents the state from trying individuals who are likely unable to assist in their defense, thereby preserving the integrity of the criminal justice system and the fairness of trials.
