Cooper v. Eugene School District No. 4J
301 Or. 358, 723 P.2d 298 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute prohibiting public school teachers from wearing religious dress while performing duties is constitutional under Oregon and federal law, provided it is narrowly interpreted to apply only when the dress is a regular, frequent, and communicative symbol of religious commitment that is incompatible with maintaining an atmosphere of religious neutrality in the classroom.
Facts:
- Janet Cooper was a special education teacher in the Eugene public schools.
- She converted to Sikhism, changing her name to Karta Kaur Khalsa.
- As part of her religious practice, Cooper began wearing white clothes and a white turban while teaching her sixth and eighth-grade classes.
- Cooper informed the school staff via letter that she would wear the turban and often wear white clothing as part of her religious practice and had explained these changes to her students.
- Cooper was warned that wearing religious dress at work violated state law (ORS 342.650) and could lead to suspension.
- Despite the warning, Cooper continued to wear her white garb and turban while teaching.
Procedural Posture:
- The school superintendent, acting for the district school board, suspended Janet Cooper from teaching for violating ORS 342.650.
- The school superintendent reported this action to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, who is directed by ORS 342.655 to revoke the teacher's certificate upon such a report.
- The Superintendent of Public Instruction, after a hearing, revoked Cooper’s teaching certificate.
- Cooper challenged this order on constitutional grounds in the Oregon Court of Appeals.
- The Oregon Court of Appeals set aside the revocation of Cooper’s teaching certificate, finding it an excessive sanction under its understanding of federal First Amendment doctrine.
- The school district and the Superintendent of Public Instruction (appellants) petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review of the Court of Appeals' decision, with Cooper as the respondent.
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Issue:
Does ORS 342.650, which prohibits public school teachers from wearing religious dress while performing their duties, violate the guarantees of religious freedom under Article I, sections 2 and 3 of the Oregon Constitution or the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, particularly when applied to a teacher wearing a Sikh turban and white clothes?
Opinions:
Majority - Linde, J.
No, ORS 342.650, when correctly interpreted and applied, does not violate Oregon's guarantees of religious freedom or the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The court reasoned that the law's aim is to maintain religious neutrality in public schools, an objective that furthers a constitutional obligation to provide a uniform system of common schools free from sectarian influence and to protect the religious freedom of students under Article VIII, section 3, and Article I, sections 2 and 3 of the Oregon Constitution. The court emphasized that the Oregon Constitution's religious freedom clauses should be interpreted independently, sometimes providing broader protection than the federal First Amendment. While acknowledging that restricting dress for religious reasons impacts the free exercise of religion, the court found such a restriction permissible if justified by an actual incompatibility with the teaching function. The court narrowly construed "religious dress" to mean clothing worn by reason of its religious importance to the teacher that also conveys a degree of religious commitment to students of typical age and background. It further limited "performance of duties as a teacher" to direct contact with children in a teaching or counseling role where the dress is truly incompatible with the school's commitment to religious neutrality. Crucially, the court specified that only "continual or frequent repetition" of appearing in specifically religious dress, creating a "constant and inescapable visual reminder" of religious commitment, would violate the statute, not occasional appearances. This interpretation prevents the law from being overbroad and infringing unconstitutionally on religious expression. The court also clarified that the revocation of a teaching certificate under ORS 342.655 is a disqualification based on incompatibility with the teaching function, not a penalty for religious belief, and thus does not violate the First Amendment.
Analysis:
This case is significant as it upholds a state statute restricting teacher dress based on religious neutrality concerns, but only by imposing a strict, narrow interpretation of the statute's scope. It reinforces the principle that state courts can interpret their own constitutional provisions to provide greater protections than federal law, here by analyzing the Oregon Constitution's religious freedom clauses. The court's emphasis on balancing a teacher's right to religious expression with the state's interest in maintaining a neutral educational environment provides a framework for evaluating similar conflicts, particularly by requiring a high threshold of actual "incompatibility" before restricting religious displays.
