Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
274 F. Supp. 781, 66 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2489, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7828 (1967)
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Rule of Law:
An employment policy requiring a specific class of female employees to be unmarried is not discrimination "because of sex" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as the basis for the policy is marital status, which is not a protected characteristic under the statute.
Facts:
- Eulalie E. Cooper was employed by Delta Air Lines as a stewardess.
- As a condition of her employment, Cooper signed an agreement certifying she was unmarried and would automatically terminate her employment if she were to marry.
- Delta's policy required only its stewardesses, an all-female position, to remain unmarried.
- This marital status requirement was not applied to any of Delta's other employees, male or female.
- On October 17, 1964, Cooper married while still employed by Delta.
- On April 1, 1966, Delta terminated Cooper's employment because she had gotten married.
Procedural Posture:
- Eulalie E. Cooper filed a charge of discrimination against Delta Air Lines with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
- The EEOC did not make a determination as to the validity of her case but issued a statutory letter advising Cooper of her right to file a civil suit.
- Cooper filed suit against Delta in U.S. District Court, seeking reinstatement, back wages, and an injunction against the policy.
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Issue:
Does an airline's policy of employing only unmarried women as flight attendants, while not applying a similar marital status restriction to any male employees, constitute an unlawful employment practice of discrimination "because of sex" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
Opinions:
Majority - Comiskey, District Judge
No. An airline's policy requiring stewardesses to be unmarried does not constitute unlawful sex discrimination because it is based on marital status, a category not protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court reasoned through a plain reading of the statute, which prohibits discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The court found that "marital status" is conspicuously absent from this list. It rejected the plaintiff's argument that the policy constituted sex discrimination because it only applied to female employees, asserting that the true basis of the discrimination was the plaintiff's married status, not her female status. The court concluded that the law does not prevent an employer from discriminating against married individuals in favor of single ones.
Analysis:
This case represents an early, narrow interpretation of sex discrimination under Title VII, introducing what would become known as the "sex-plus" problem. By separating marital status from sex, even when the policy exclusively burdened women, the court allowed a form of discrimination that had a clear disparate impact on female employees. This decision's reasoning was later rejected by the Supreme Court in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. (1971), which held that an employer could not have different hiring policies for men and women based on family obligations. This case is therefore significant as a historical marker demonstrating the initial judicial reluctance to interpret "because of sex" broadly, a view that was subsequently overturned as the jurisprudence in this area evolved.
