Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.
543 U.S. 157 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
Under § 113(f)(1) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), a private party may not seek contribution from another potentially responsible party (PRP) for environmental cleanup costs unless it has first been subjected to a civil action under CERCLA § 106 or § 107(a).
Facts:
- Cooper Industries, Inc. (Cooper) owned and operated four aircraft engine maintenance sites in Texas, which became contaminated with hazardous substances during its operations.
- In 1981, Cooper sold the contaminated sites to Aviall Services, Inc. (Aviall).
- Aviall continued to operate the sites and also contributed to the contamination.
- After discovering the contamination from both its and Cooper's operations, Aviall notified the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (Commission).
- The Commission informed Aviall that it was in violation of state law and directed it to clean up the sites, threatening an enforcement action if it failed to do so.
- However, neither the Commission nor the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took any judicial or administrative measures to formally compel the cleanup.
- Aviall proceeded to clean up the properties under the state's supervision, incurring approximately $5 million in costs.
Procedural Posture:
- Aviall sued Cooper in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking contribution for cleanup costs under CERCLA § 113(f)(1).
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Cooper, holding that a § 113(f)(1) claim is only available to a party that has been sued under CERCLA § 106 or § 107.
- Aviall appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, where a divided panel affirmed the District Court's decision.
- The Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and reversed the panel's decision, holding that § 113(f)(1) allows a contribution claim regardless of whether a prior civil action has been filed.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.
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Issue:
Does § 113(f)(1) of CERCLA authorize a private party that has not been sued under § 106 or § 107(a) to obtain contribution from other liable parties for environmental cleanup costs it incurred voluntarily?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Thomas
No. A party may seek contribution under § 113(f)(1) of CERCLA only after being sued in a civil action under § 106 or § 107(a). The plain text of the statute states that a party 'may seek contribution... during or following any civil action' under those sections. This language establishes a necessary condition, not merely one possible trigger for a contribution claim. To read the statute as allowing a contribution claim at any time would render the 'during or following' phrase superfluous, violating a core principle of statutory construction. This interpretation is further supported by the structure of § 113, which provides a separate contribution right for parties who settle with the government and includes statutes of limitation that are triggered only by a judgment or settlement, not by a voluntary cleanup. The statute's saving clause—'Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action'—does not create an independent cause of action but merely preserves any other contribution rights that may exist outside of § 113(f)(1).
Dissenting - Justice Ginsburg
The Court should have resolved the case by holding that Aviall is entitled to seek reimbursement from Cooper under CERCLA § 107(a), rather than remanding the issue. This Court's precedent in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States established that § 107 provides a cause of action for potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to recover their cleanup costs. Aviall properly raised a § 107 claim, and its subsequent combination of that claim with its § 113 claim was merely a matter of complying with then-existing circuit precedent, not a waiver of its rights. By deferring a decision on the § 107 issue, the Court unnecessarily protracts litigation on a matter the lower courts have essentially already decided and which this Court's own precedent supports.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the scope of contribution rights under CERCLA, creating what is known as the 'contribution gap.' It established that parties who voluntarily clean up contaminated sites without being sued first cannot use § 113(f)(1) to force other polluters to share the cost. This ruling created an incentive for PRPs to wait for government enforcement action rather than initiating proactive cleanups, potentially delaying environmental remediation. The Court's refusal to decide the availability of a cost recovery action under § 107(a) for PRPs left a critical question unanswered, leading to further litigation and a circuit split on whether § 107(a) could be used to fill the gap created by this decision.
