Conroy v. State
1992 WL 342043, 843 S.W.2d 67, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 3315 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense if there is any evidence from any source, regardless of its credibility, that would permit a jury to rationally find that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense.
Facts:
- After several hours of drinking, Edward Patrick Conroy and his friends returned to his house and were joined by four women from an escort service, including Elissa Anne Roberts.
- Conroy decided to play a prank by pretending to be a vice officer making an arrest.
- He retrieved his handgun, removed two bullets for what he termed "safety reasons," but left three rounds in the revolver's chambers.
- Conroy entered two separate bedrooms, threatening the occupants by pointing the loaded gun at them and, in one instance, pressing it to a woman's head.
- Conroy then went to a third occupied room, opened the door while holding the cocked handgun at waist level with his finger on the trigger.
- The weapon discharged, striking Elissa Anne Roberts in the head and killing her.
- Conroy had prior military training in firearm use and acknowledged he knew the gun was loaded and cocked at the time of the incident.
Procedural Posture:
- Edward Patrick Conroy was charged with murder in a Texas trial court.
- Conroy entered a plea of not guilty.
- At trial, Conroy requested a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide, which the court denied.
- A jury found Conroy guilty of the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter and assessed punishment at three years confinement.
- Conroy (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Texas Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in refusing his requested jury instruction.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's testimony that a fatal shooting was an accident, and that they mistakenly believed their firearm was safe, constitute sufficient evidence of a failure to perceive risk to require a trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide?
Opinions:
Majority - Mirabal, Justice.
Yes. A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide when their testimony provides some evidence they failed to perceive the risk of their actions. The distinction between recklessness (involuntary manslaughter) and criminal negligence is the defendant's mental state: recklessness involves consciously disregarding a known substantial risk, whereas negligence involves the failure to perceive a substantial risk that an ordinary person would have perceived. In this case, Conroy testified that he did not intend to shoot anyone, that the gun 'just went off accidentally,' and that he believed the gun was safe due to his arrangement of the empty chambers. Although this evidence is contradicted and may seem incredible, its credibility is a question for the jury, not the judge. Because this testimony, if believed, could support a finding that Conroy was guilty only of failing to perceive the risk, the trial court erred by refusing to give the requested instruction on criminally negligent homicide.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the low evidentiary threshold required to warrant a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense. It establishes that a defendant's own self-serving testimony about their subjective mental state—even if weak, contradicted, or incredible—is sufficient to raise the issue for the jury. The decision reinforces the principle that the trial judge may not weigh the credibility of evidence when determining whether to give such an instruction, preserving that function exclusively for the jury. For future cases, this precedent empowers defense counsel to secure lesser-included offense instructions based solely on the defendant's testimony, potentially leading to compromise verdicts or convictions on less serious charges.
