Connersville Diagnostic & Therapeutic Center, Inc. v. Thomas
649 N.E.2d 636, 1994 Ind. App. LEXIS 1950, 1994 WL 792384 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
Trial courts in Indiana have narrow statutory jurisdiction under the Medical Malpractice Act to make preliminary determinations, limited to affirmative defenses, issues under Trial Rule 12(D), or compelling discovery, and cannot address other matters such as separating plaintiffs' claims.
Facts:
- Patricia Thomas, Phyllis Clark, and Rosemary Frasher alleged that they were injured due to the medical negligence of Connersville Diagnostic and Therapeutic Center, Inc., Usha Patel, M.D., Jerome Geisting, M.D., and Vidyassagar S. Tumuluri, M.D.
- Under Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act, such allegations are first submitted to the Indiana Department of Insurance for review by a medical review panel.
- During this pre-litigation review process, Dr. Patel and Dr. Tumuluri requested that a trial court separate the individual negligence claims of Thomas, Clark, and Frasher.
Procedural Posture:
- Patricia Thomas, Phyllis Clark, and Rosemary Frasher filed a proposed complaint alleging medical negligence with the Indiana Department of Insurance against Connersville Diagnostic and Therapeutic Center, Inc., Usha Patel, M.D., Jerome Geisting, M.D., and Vidyassagar S. Tumuluri, M.D., as required by the Medical Malpractice Act.
- Dr. Patel, joined by Dr. Tumuluri, subsequently filed a Motion for Preliminary Determination of Law in the trial court (court of first instance), seeking to separate the claims of the plaintiffs.
- The trial court dismissed the defendants' motion, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make such a preliminary determination, citing Griffith v. Jones and Santiago v. Kilmer.
- Connersville Diagnostic and Therapeutic Center, Inc., Usha Patel, M.D., Jerome Geisting, M.D., and Vidyassagar S. Tumuluri, M.D. (appellants) appealed the trial court's dismissal to the Indiana Court of Appeals. Patricia Thomas, Phyllis Clark, and Rosemary Frasher were the appellees.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err in dismissing the defendants' Motion for Preliminary Determination of Law, which sought to separate the plaintiffs' claims, given the limited scope of trial court jurisdiction under the Medical Malpractice Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Riley, Judge
No, the trial court did not err in dismissing the defendants' motion because the requested preliminary determination fell outside the narrow scope of a trial court's jurisdiction under the Medical Malpractice Act. Judge Riley, writing for the majority, emphasized that the power of trial courts to make preliminary determinations under Indiana Code 27-12-11-1 is specifically limited. Citing Griffith v. Jones (1992), the court reiterated that this power extends only to affirmative defenses under the Indiana Trial Rules, issues of law or fact determinable under Trial Rule 12(D), and compelling discovery under Trial Rules 26 through 37. Trial courts lack jurisdiction to instruct medical review panels, define terms used in the Medical Malpractice Act, or dictate the form or substance of a panel's opinion. The court also relied on Santiago v. Kilmer (1992), which affirmed that the statutory grant of power to trial courts for preliminary matters must be narrowly construed and does not permit preliminary determinations on issues of fact reserved for the medical panel. Since the defendants' request to separate claims was not related to affirmative defenses, T.R. 12(D) issues, or discovery, the trial court correctly dismissed the motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court dismissed arguments from other cited cases as either distinguishable or not having addressed the core jurisdictional issue.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the limited jurisdictional authority of Indiana trial courts in medical malpractice cases under the Medical Malpractice Act. It confirms that courts cannot intervene broadly in matters reserved for medical review panels or make determinations outside specific, statutorily defined preliminary issues. This narrow construction aims to preserve the intended function of the medical review panel process, ensuring that initial substantive medical negligence issues are vetted by experts before extensive judicial involvement. Future cases will continue to apply this strict interpretation, limiting litigants' ability to seek early judicial intervention on non-enumerated issues and upholding the gatekeeping function of the medical review panel.
