Connecticut v. Porter
241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739, 1997 Conn. LEXIS 155 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Connecticut adopts the Daubert standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence, which requires trial judges to act as gatekeepers to ensure evidence is both scientifically valid and relevant. However, polygraph evidence remains per se inadmissible because its prejudicial impact is deemed to consistently outweigh its limited probative value.
Facts:
- The home of the defendant, Christian E. Porter, was destroyed by a fire on July 20, 1992.
- The state alleged that Porter intentionally set the fire.
- Before his trial, Porter privately retained Leighton Hammond, a polygrapher, to conduct a polygraph examination.
- During the examination, Porter was asked questions including, "Did you set fire to your home?" and "Do you know for sure, if any person deliberately set fire to your home?"
- Porter answered "no" to these pertinent questions.
- The polygrapher, Hammond, concluded that Porter was telling the truth when he answered "no."
- The state was not given advance notification of the examination.
Procedural Posture:
- Christian E. Porter was charged with two counts of arson in the first degree in state trial court.
- Before trial, Porter filed a motion to admit the favorable results of his polygraph examination and requested an evidentiary hearing on its admissibility.
- The trial court denied the motion and the request for a hearing, citing the existing state-wide per se ban on polygraph evidence.
- Following a jury trial, Porter was convicted of one count of arson.
- Porter, as appellant, appealed the conviction to the Appellate Court of Connecticut, challenging the exclusion of the polygraph evidence.
- The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that it was bound by precedent.
- The Supreme Court of Connecticut granted Porter's petition for certification to appeal.
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Issue:
Is polygraph evidence per se inadmissible in Connecticut courts, even after the adoption of the Daubert standard for scientific evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Borden, J.
Yes, polygraph evidence remains per se inadmissible in Connecticut courts. The court formally adopts the standard from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. for the admissibility of scientific evidence, replacing the Frye 'general acceptance' test. Under Daubert, the trial judge acts as a 'gatekeeper,' assessing whether scientific testimony is both scientifically valid (reliable) and relevant to the facts of the case. Despite adopting this more flexible standard, the court holds that polygraph evidence must be categorically excluded. After an extensive review of scientific literature, the court concludes that the probative value of polygraph evidence is extremely low due to significant debate over its accuracy, the lack of data on its predictive value, and the potential for countermeasures. Conversely, its potential for prejudicial effect is very high, as it would invade the jury’s exclusive role as the arbiter of witness credibility, result in time-consuming 'battles of the experts,' and create an undue expectation for such evidence. Therefore, the prejudicial impact of polygraph evidence greatly outweighs its probative value, justifying the continuation of the per se rule of inadmissibility.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Berdon, J.
No, polygraph evidence should not be per se inadmissible, and the defendant should have been granted an evidentiary hearing. While agreeing with the adoption of the Daubert standard, a per se rule excluding polygraph evidence infringes upon a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense, particularly in a case where credibility is crucial. The majority errs by deciding the ultimate scientific validity of polygraphs as a matter of law based on its own literature review, which denies the defendant his due process right to be heard and to create a factual record. The trend in federal courts since Daubert has been to abandon such per se rules and allow trial courts to assess admissibility on a case-by-case basis. The potential prejudice from polygraph evidence does not justify a blanket ban that could lead to the conviction of an innocent person, especially when its accuracy, by some measures, is significant.
Dissenting - McDonald, J.
No, polygraph evidence should not be deemed per se inadmissible under the standard the majority applies. The dissent focuses on the majority's post-publication alteration of the evidentiary balancing test, changing it from the federal standard where prejudice must 'substantially outweigh' probative value to a less stringent standard where it merely 'outweighs' it. This change, made without the benefit of advocacy, makes it easier to exclude potentially helpful evidence. The proper standard, requiring that prejudice 'substantially' outweigh probative value, should have been adopted. Under that more appropriate standard, a per se rule of exclusion for polygraph evidence would be less justifiable.
Analysis:
This case marks a significant shift in Connecticut's evidence law by formally abandoning the Frye 'general acceptance' test in favor of the more flexible Daubert standard. This aligns Connecticut with federal courts and a growing number of states, empowering trial judges as 'gatekeepers' to assess scientific validity. However, the decision's impact is uniquely demonstrated by its holding on polygraphs; by reaffirming the per se ban, the court establishes that even under the new Daubert standard, certain categories of evidence can be deemed so inherently prejudicial as to warrant categorical exclusion. This creates a dual precedent: a general, flexible standard for most scientific evidence, while preserving the court's power to enact a per se ban on specific types of evidence it finds fundamentally problematic.
