Conley v. Romeri
2004 Mass. App. LEXIS 405, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 799, 806 N.E.2d 933 (2004)
Rule of Law:
Courts are reluctant to impose tort liability for claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or battery arising from alleged misrepresentations or conduct within private, consensual adult romantic relationships, particularly when the alleged harm is primarily emotional distress and does not involve physical injury or a breach of a clearly established legal duty.
Facts:
- In June 1996, the plaintiff and the defendant began a romantic relationship; both were in their early forties and divorced, with the plaintiff having no children and the defendant having four from a previous marriage.
- In July 1996, during a discussion about the future of their relationship, the plaintiff expressed her desire to have a family, and the defendant responded that a fortune teller had told him he would have six children, telling the plaintiff she should not "worry."
- Feeling assured by the defendant's statement, the plaintiff chose to remain in the relationship, and the parties became sexually intimate in September 1996.
- Around October 1996, the defendant asked the plaintiff whether he had "gotten [her] in trouble," implying he was capable of fathering children.
- In February 1997, the defendant revealed to the plaintiff that he had undergone a vasectomy in 1993.
- The plaintiff claimed that this disclosure emotionally devastated her, leading to a major depressive disorder, incurred medical expenses, and an inability to reverse the economic position of her company.
- The parties continued dating and being intimate until April 1997, when the defendant informed the plaintiff that he had met another woman, and the plaintiff subsequently ended the relationship.
Procedural Posture:
- In June 1999, the plaintiff filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the defendant.
- A motion judge in the Superior Court allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss (pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)) the counts for negligent infliction of emotional distress and fraud.
- The motion judge denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, indicating that the plaintiff had pleaded the "correct elements" and suggesting that a motion for summary judgment might be appropriate for that claim.
- On November 22, 1999, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding a claim for assault and battery.
- In October 2001, another Superior Court judge allowed the defendant's motion for summary judgment (pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56) on the remaining claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery in favor of the defendant.
- The plaintiff then appealed the dismissal of her complaint in the Superior Court to the Massachusetts Appeals Court.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's alleged misrepresentation about having a vasectomy during a consensual romantic relationship, which causes the plaintiff emotional distress and impacts her life choices, give rise to legally cognizable claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or battery?
Opinions:
Majority - Cypher, J.
No, a defendant's alleged misrepresentation about having a vasectomy during a consensual romantic relationship, which causes the plaintiff emotional distress and impacts her life choices, does not give rise to legally cognizable claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or battery under these circumstances. The court affirmed the dismissal of all claims. First, for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court found no legally cognizable duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff in a dating relationship regarding honesty about procreative ability. A duty of care is fundamental to a negligence claim, and determining such a duty involves existing social values, customs, and appropriate social policy, which the plaintiff failed to identify as applicable here. Second, regarding fraud, the court declined to assess the materiality of the alleged misrepresentation (the defendant's vasectomy) in the context of a developing romantic relationship, stating there are no jurisprudential standards for doing so. Citing Stephen K. v. Roni L., the court emphasized that such claims are "intensely private" and asking courts to supervise "promises made between two consenting adults as to the circumstances of their private sexual conduct" would be inappropriate. Third, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendant's conduct did not meet the "extreme and outrageous" standard required for this tort. Even if the defendant intended to cause emotional distress or created false expectations, his actions did not rise to the "high order of reckless ruthlessness or deliberate malevolence" deemed "intolerable in a civilized community." The court noted that the relationship continued after the revelation and only ended when the defendant met someone else. Finally, concerning battery, the court held that the plaintiff's consent to sexual relations was not vitiated by the defendant's failure to disclose his vasectomy. The defendant's earlier statement about having six children was made at an early stage of the relationship and could only be seen as an inducement to continue dating, not to induce sexual intercourse. There were no discussions about having children together or marriage. The court distinguished this case from Barbara A. v. John G., where a plaintiff suffered physical injury (ectopic pregnancy) due to a false representation of sterility; here, the plaintiff's claimed injury was emotional distress and "wasted time," which does not constitute a battery.
Analysis:
This case highlights the significant reluctance of Massachusetts courts to intervene in the highly private and intimate dynamics of romantic relationships by imposing tort liability for emotional distress or misrepresentation, especially when no physical injury or universally recognized duty is breached. It reinforces the principle that not all "human wrongs," however emotionally impactful, are legally compensable. The decision sets a high bar for claims of extreme and outrageous conduct in personal relationships and emphasizes the absence of clear legal standards for assessing the "materiality" of alleged misrepresentations within them, thereby limiting the scope of tort law in such contexts.
