Conkright v. Frommert
130 S. Ct. 1640, 559 U.S. 506, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3479 (2009)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An applicant seeking a stay of a lower court's judgment must demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm, and a potential monetary loss that may be difficult to recoup is generally insufficient to meet this standard, even if the Supreme Court has signaled interest in the case by calling for the views of the Solicitor General.
Facts:
- Sally L. Conkright is the administrator of the Xerox Corporation Pension Plan.
- Paul J. Frommert and other individuals are beneficiaries of the Xerox pension plan.
- A legal dispute arose over the calculation of pension benefits owed to Frommert and the other beneficiaries.
- As a result of a lower court ruling, the plan was required to make additional payments to the beneficiaries.
- The plan administrators believed that if they made these court-ordered payments, it would be difficult to recover the funds from the numerous beneficiaries if the ruling were later overturned.
Procedural Posture:
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision and mandate in favor of Paul J. Frommert et al.
- Sally L. Conkright et al., the plan administrators, filed an initial application with Justice Ginsburg, as Circuit Justice, to stay the Second Circuit's mandate.
- On October 20, 2008, Justice Ginsburg denied the initial stay application.
- Conkright et al. then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.
- On March 2, 2009, the Supreme Court issued a Call for the Views of the Solicitor General (CVSG) regarding the certiorari petition.
- Following the CVSG, Conkright et al. reapplied to Justice Ginsburg for a stay of the Second Circuit's mandate.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Supreme Court's call for the views of the Solicitor General on a petition for certiorari, by itself, satisfy the requirements for granting a stay of a lower court's judgment, particularly the requirement of irreparable harm?
Opinions:
Opinion in Chambers - Justice Ginsburg
No. A call for the views of the Solicitor General (CVSG) does not, by itself, warrant a stay of a lower court's judgment because an applicant must still satisfy all prongs of the stay analysis, including a showing of irreparable harm. Justice Ginsburg applied the established three-part test for granting a stay, which requires: (1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will grant certiorari, (2) a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will reverse the decision, and (3) a likelihood of irreparable harm. While a CVSG is relevant to the first prong, as it increases the statistical probability of a cert grant, it is not dispositive, and the Court denies certiorari in such cases more often than not. More importantly, a CVSG does not alter the analysis of the other prongs. The applicants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because their asserted injury—the difficulty of recouping disbursed funds—is a monetary loss. Citing Sampson v. Murray, the opinion states that mere monetary injuries, even if substantial, are generally not considered irreparable, especially when corrective relief may be available later. The applicants did not establish that recoupment would be impossible or that the payments would place the pension plan in jeopardy.
Analysis:
This opinion in chambers reinforces the exceptionally high bar for obtaining a stay from a Supreme Court Justice pending certiorari. It clarifies that procedural indicators of the Court's interest, such as a CVSG, do not relieve the applicant of their burden to independently satisfy each element of the stay test. The decision specifically solidifies the Court's narrow interpretation of 'irreparable harm,' distinguishing recoverable monetary losses from the kind of extraordinary, non-compensable injury required to justify a stay. This serves as a strong precedent for future applicants, cautioning that the difficulty of recouping funds alone is insufficient to halt the enforcement of a lower court's judgment.
