Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo
405 Mass. 365, 540 N.E.2d 691 (1989)
Rule of Law:
An oral promise to make a charitable donation is unenforceable as a contract if it is not supported by consideration or reliance. A mere expectation of receiving the funds or internally budgeting for the donation is insufficient to establish legally cognizable reliance.
Facts:
- A decedent suffered a prolonged illness during which he was visited by Rabbi Abraham Halbfinger, the spiritual leader of the Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe (Congregation).
- During four or five of these visits, in the presence of witnesses, the decedent made an oral promise to give the Congregation $25,000.
- The Congregation planned to use the promised funds to convert a storage room into a library and name it after the decedent.
- The decedent's oral promise was never reduced to writing.
- The decedent died intestate (without a will), survived by his wife.
Procedural Posture:
- Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe (Congregation) sued the administrator of the decedent's estate in the Superior Court to enforce the oral promise.
- The case was transferred to the Boston Municipal Court, which granted summary judgment in favor of the estate.
- The case was then transferred back to the Superior Court, which also granted summary judgment for the estate and dismissed the Congregation's complaint.
- The Congregation (appellant) sought and was granted direct appellate review by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
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Issue:
Is an oral promise to make a charitable donation, which is not supported by consideration or reliance, an enforceable contract against the promisor's estate?
Opinions:
Majority - Liacos, C.J.
No. An oral promise to make a charitable donation is not an enforceable contract without consideration or reliance. The court found that the decedent's promise was an oral gratuitous pledge. There was no consideration because the decedent (the promisor) received no legal benefit, and the Congregation (the promisee) incurred no legal detriment. The Congregation’s plan to name a library after the decedent did not induce the promise, but was rather a unilateral plan. Furthermore, there was no legally sufficient reliance; the Congregation's action of allocating the $25,000 in its budget was merely a written expectation of receiving a future gift, not a detrimental change in position made in reliance on the promise. The court declined to adopt the more liberal rule of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(2), stating that enforcing an oral promise unsupported by consideration or reliance against an estate would be against public policy.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the traditional contract law requirements of consideration or reliance for charitable subscriptions in Massachusetts, declining to adopt the more lenient standard proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The court shows particular caution in enforcing oral promises against an estate, highlighting a public policy to protect estates from claims based on informal, un-bargained-for pledges. The ruling solidifies the principle that a charity's hope or internal planning based on a promised donation does not constitute the kind of detrimental reliance needed to make the promise enforceable. This places a clear burden on charitable organizations to secure written pledges or demonstrate tangible, detrimental reliance to ensure a donor's promise is legally binding.
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