Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan
1991 WL 44402, 928 F.2d 1496 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
An action must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 if an Indian tribe is a necessary party whose legal interests would be prejudiced by the litigation, cannot be joined due to sovereign immunity, and is deemed indispensable after an equitable balancing of factors, even if no alternative forum exists for the plaintiffs.
Facts:
- In 1855, the United States, represented by Governor Isaac Stevens, sought to consolidate all coastal and interior Indian tribes of the Olympic Peninsula onto a single reservation.
- The Quinault and Quillehute Tribes were the only ones who signed the Treaty of Olympia, leading to the establishment of a reservation.
- The initial reservation proved insufficient for the needs of these tribes.
- President Grant issued an Executive Order on November 4, 1873, expanding the reservation for the 'use of the Quinault, Quillehute, Hoh, Quit, and other tribes of fish-eating Indians on the Pacific coast.'
- Several of these affiliated tribes and individual tribal members filed an action seeking to enjoin federal officials from recognizing the Quinault Indian Nation as the sole governing authority for the Quinault Indian Reservation.
- The plaintiffs also sought a judgment declaring their equal rights in the Reservation and that the governing body should reflect the rights of all Indians allotted at the Reservation.
Procedural Posture:
- Several affiliated tribes and individual tribal members (plaintiffs) filed an action in federal district court against federal officials.
- The United States, on behalf of the federal officials, moved to dismiss the action, arguing, among other things, that the plaintiffs failed to join an indispensable party, the Quinault Indian Nation.
- The district court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the Quinault Indian Nation was an indispensable party and therefore the government succeeded in its motion.
- The plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal to the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Quinault Indian Nation, due to its sovereign immunity, constitute an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, thereby requiring the dismissal of an action challenging its authority over the Quinault Indian Reservation?
Opinions:
Majority - Skopil, Circuit Judge
Yes, the Quinault Indian Nation is an indispensable party, and therefore, the action must be dismissed. The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, first determining if the Quinault Nation was a "necessary" party under Rule 19(a) and then an "indispensable" party under Rule 19(b) because it could not be joined due to sovereign immunity. First, the court found the Quinault Nation to be a necessary party. Complete relief could not be afforded to the plaintiffs without the Quinault Nation's presence because a judgment against federal officials would not bind the Nation, which could continue to assert sovereign powers. Furthermore, the Quinault Nation clearly had a legal interest in the litigation; the plaintiffs sought to reject its exclusive governing authority, and even partial success for the plaintiffs could subject both the Quinault Nation and the federal government to a substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent legal obligations, as supported by precedents like Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity. Second, because the Quinault Nation is a sovereign entity and had not waived its immunity, it could not be joined. The court then applied the four factors of Rule 19(b) to determine if it was indispensable. The court agreed with the district court that a judgment for the plaintiffs would clearly prejudice the Quinault Nation by altering its existing authority. No partial or compromise remedy could avoid this prejudice. While acknowledging the plaintiffs' lack of an alternative forum, the court reiterated that this factor alone does not automatically prevent dismissal. The court concluded that a plaintiff's interest in litigation may be outweighed by a tribe's interest in maintaining sovereign immunity, affirming the dismissal.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - O’Scannlain, Circuit Judge
No, the Quinault Indian Nation is not necessarily an indispensable party requiring dismissal of the entire complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, though some claims should be dismissed on other grounds. The majority adopted an overly broad interpretation of the compulsory joinder rule. Judge O'Scannlain disagreed that the Quinault Nation was a "necessary" party under Rule 19(a). He argued that complete relief could be afforded against the federal officials for the relief prayed for in the complaint, distinguishing the case from Makah Indian Tribe by noting there was no "pie to carve up" or limited resource at issue; rather, plaintiffs sought to vindicate rights to which all Indians on the reservation are entitled. He also contended that the Quinault Nation's "self-interest" in maintaining its status was not a "legally protected interest" under Rule 19(a)(2) and that the majority prejudged the plaintiffs' claim by assuming the legitimacy of the Quinaults' current authority. Furthermore, he noted that Rule 19(a)(2)(ii) protects "already parties" from inconsistent obligations, not absent parties. Regarding indispensability under Rule 19(b), the judge found the majority's reasoning infirm for similar reasons, again arguing that "alteration" of status is not necessarily "prejudice" to legal rights, and that the court could fashion relief to avoid prejudice to legitimate rights. He stressed that the requested relief targeted federal officials, so the Quinault Nation's presence was not required for an adequate remedy. While acknowledging the lack of an alternative forum for plaintiffs, he argued this factor weighs heavily against dismissal and that Rule 19 is an equitable rule of discretion, not a rigid one. He also suggested that some claims (third and sixth causes of action, seeking to dictate future federal dealings) should be dismissed as non-justiciable political questions, but claims seeking a declaration of existing rights (first and fifth causes of action) or potential civil rights claims should proceed or be allowed to amend.
Analysis:
This case underscores the formidable barrier that tribal sovereign immunity presents to litigation involving Indian tribes. It demonstrates how courts, particularly the Ninth Circuit, apply the stringent two-part test of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. The decision reiterates that even when a plaintiff has no alternative forum, a tribe's immunity can compel dismissal if the tribe is deemed a necessary and indispensable party. This ruling limits the avenues for challenging the governance of reservations by federally recognized tribes through suits against federal officials, solidifying the legal position of tribes as sovereign entities in litigation contexts and reinforcing the principle that tribal interests, especially governing authority, are legally protected for Rule 19 purposes.
