Conboy v. Mogeloff
567 N.Y.S.2d 960, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4257, 172 A.D.2d 912 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A physician does not owe a legal duty to non-patient third parties for harm resulting from advice given to a patient, as the physician lacks the ability and authority to control the patient's conduct. A duty to a third party may arise only where there is a relationship approaching privity, demonstrated by conduct linking the physician to the third party and showing the physician's understanding of the third party's reliance.
Facts:
- On September 1, 1983, Ruth Dillenbeck consulted the defendant physician for persistent headaches and occasional episodes of unconsciousness.
- The defendant diagnosed Dillenbeck with migraines and prescribed the medication Fiorinal.
- In response to Dillenbeck's specific inquiry, the defendant advised her that she could continue to drive a car.
- On September 6, 1983, Dillenbeck took a Fiorinal tablet after experiencing a headache.
- Approximately one hour later, while driving with her children as passengers, Dillenbeck lost consciousness.
- The vehicle Dillenbeck was operating collided with a bridge abutment, causing injuries to her children.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff, on behalf of the injured children, sued the defendant physician in the Supreme Court of Montgomery County (a state trial court) for negligence and malpractice.
- After issue was joined, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a cause of action because he owed no legal duty to the children.
- The Supreme Court (trial court) denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
- The defendant (appellant) appealed the trial court's denial to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (an intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Does a physician who advises a patient that she can drive while taking prescribed medication owe a duty of care to the patient's children who are subsequently injured when the patient loses consciousness while driving?
Opinions:
Majority - Crew III, J.
No. A physician does not owe a duty of care to the children of a patient under these circumstances. The general rule is that a person has no legal duty to control the conduct of a third person to prevent them from harming others. While an exception exists for special relationships, it applies only when the defendant has the ability and authority to control the third person's conduct. Here, the physician-patient relationship did not grant the defendant such control; Dillenbeck was free to accept or reject the defendant's advice and make her own decisions about driving. The court rejected the argument that a duty existed based on the third parties' reliance, noting that precedent would require a relationship 'approaching privity,' where the defendant's conduct links them to the third party and shows an understanding of that party's reliance. The plaintiff failed to allege any facts showing the children's reliance on the defendant or the defendant's knowledge of any such reliance.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the traditional common law principle that a duty of care is generally not owed to prevent a third party from causing harm, narrowly construing the exceptions to this rule in the medical context. It establishes that for a physician's duty to extend to a non-patient, there must be a showing of either direct control over the patient or a relationship approaching privity with the third party, which requires knowledge of the third party's reliance. This ruling protects medical professionals from potentially limitless liability to an indeterminate class of people who might be affected by their patients' actions, thereby solidifying the boundary of professional duty to the patient alone absent special circumstances.
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