Commonwealth v. Worthy
598 Pa. 470, 2008 Pa. LEXIS 1905, 957 A.2d 720 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
A temporary suspension of a police sobriety checkpoint to relieve traffic congestion, made pursuant to the on-site officer’s discretion, does not violate the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, provided that when the checkpoint is operational, all vehicles are stopped in a systematic and non-discriminatory manner.
Facts:
- On May 15, 2002, administrative officials of the Monroeville Police Department authorized a sobriety checkpoint for State Route 22 in Monroeville, Allegheny County.
- The chosen location, State Route 22, was selected due to a high incidence of motor vehicle accidents and arrests for driving under the influence (DUI).
- The authorization memorandum specified the checkpoint would operate from 2300 hours on May 24, 2002, to no later than 0400 hours on May 25, 2002.
- On the night of May 24, 2002, Sergeant Ronald Harvey and other police officers established the sobriety checkpoint on Route 22, posting visible signs several hundred feet in advance.
- When the checkpoint was operating, officers stopped every vehicle; however, on three occasions, Sergeant Harvey temporarily suspended the operation due to heavy traffic causing unreasonable delays, allowing all vehicles to pass unimpeded.
- Mark S. Worthy was driving one of the vehicles stopped by an officer at the checkpoint.
- The officer determined Worthy exhibited bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and emitted a strong smell of alcohol.
- Worthy failed three field sobriety tests and a breath test.
Procedural Posture:
- Mark S. Worthy was arrested and charged with two DUI offenses.
- Worthy filed an omnibus pretrial motion in the trial court to suppress evidence obtained from the stop, contending his constitutional rights under the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions were violated because the checkpoint did not comply with Tarbert-Blouse guidelines.
- The trial court conducted a suppression hearing and granted Worthy's motion, concluding that on-site officers lacked authority to suspend and restart the checkpoint without pre-fixed administrative criteria, thus exercising unfettered discretion.
- The Commonwealth appealed the trial court's ruling to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (intermediate appellate court).
- The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the decision to temporarily suspend and resume the sobriety checkpoint was controlled by the arbitrary and unfettered discretion of officers at the scene, rather than by established administrative procedures.
- The Commonwealth petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for allowance of appeal.
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Issue:
Does the temporary suspension of a police sobriety checkpoint by an on-site officer to alleviate traffic congestion, without specific pre-fixed administrative guidelines for such suspensions, violate the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by conferring unfettered discretion on the officer?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice McCaffery
No, the temporary suspension of a police sobriety checkpoint by an on-site officer to alleviate traffic congestion, without specific pre-fixed administrative guidelines for such suspensions, does not violate the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court held that systematic, nondiscriminatory, non-arbitrary checkpoints are constitutionally permissible if they substantially comply with the Tarbert-Blouse guidelines. The fifth guideline requires that the decision as to which vehicles to stop not be left to the unfettered discretion of officers at the scene. In this case, when the checkpoint was operating, every vehicle was stopped. Sergeant Harvey only suspended operations when traffic volume caused unreasonable delays, allowing all vehicles to pass unimpeded, and resumed when traffic abated. His decision to suspend and resume was based on trained observations of traffic conditions to ensure safety and reasonable delay, not on the characteristics of any particular vehicle or driver. This exercise of discretion, limited by the objectives of maximum safety and minimum delay, is not the 'unfettered discretion' regarding which vehicles to stop that the guidelines proscribe. The Court rejected the Superior Court's suggestion that such decisions must be reduced to a single, quantitative, pre-determined standard, as on-site officers are best positioned to assess complex traffic conditions to fulfill their responsibilities for safety and reasonable delay.
Concurring - Chief Justice Castille
No, the temporary suspension of a police sobriety checkpoint by an on-site officer to alleviate traffic congestion, without specific pre-fixed administrative guidelines for such suspensions, does not warrant suppression of evidence. Chief Justice Castille joined the majority, acknowledging that the Tarbert-Blouse guidelines had an “unavoidable deficiency” as they did not account for real-world complications like traffic backup. While agreeing that future administrative authorizations should provide for such contingencies, he found no fault with the police here, who acted reasonably and in good faith in the face of an uncontemplated factor. Given that the roadblock was properly authorized and the stop reasonably conducted under the circumstances, he concluded there was no basis for suppression, aligning with the constitutional command of reasonableness.
Concurring - Justice Eakin
No, the temporary suspension of a police sobriety checkpoint by an on-site officer to alleviate traffic congestion, without specific pre-fixed administrative guidelines for such suspensions, did not make the checkpoint unconstitutional. Justice Eakin joined the majority's reversal but clarified his view that the Tarbert-Blouse guidelines should not be interpreted as an exclusive five-factor test, but rather as a non-exclusive list of important factors to be analyzed in every case. He contended that “substantial compliance” does not necessarily mean meeting all five factors completely; it can vary, and in some cases, meeting fewer factors or substantially, but not completely, meeting all five could constitute compliance. He advocated for a “totality of the circumstances” approach, similar to those used for probable cause or reasonable suspicion, rather than a rigid, exclusive list, to evaluate the constitutionality of a checkpoint stop.
Dissenting - Justice Saylor
Yes, the temporary suspension of a police sobriety checkpoint by an on-site officer to alleviate traffic congestion, without specific pre-fixed administrative guidelines for such suspensions, violates the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Justice Saylor argued that the Constitution requires administrative guidelines to be established in advance to channel the decision of whether and when to suspend and resume checkpoint operations due to traffic congestion. He emphasized that suspicionless seizures are “highly disfavored” and only allowed under the “most exacting standards,” requiring a balance between public interest and regulated seizure. Traffic buildup is a foreseeable condition stemming from the nature of checkpoints, and establishing parameters to guide officers in pausing and resuming operations is a straightforward undertaking. Leaving such decisions to the 'unbridled discretion' of officers at the scene, even with good faith, creates an opportunity for pretextual suspensions and defeats the purpose of the Tarbert-Blouse guidelines to eliminate arbitrary discretion. He feared that the majority’s decision would dilute the stringent Tarbert-Blouse criteria, inviting further erosion of constitutional protections against arbitrary seizures.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of police discretion at sobriety checkpoints in Pennsylvania, particularly regarding operational adjustments. By distinguishing discretion over when to suspend or resume operations (driven by safety and efficiency) from discretion over which vehicles to stop (which must remain systematic), the Court allows for practical flexibility in law enforcement without undermining core constitutional safeguards against arbitrary seizures. However, it also highlights an ongoing tension between bright-line rules designed to protect individual liberties and the need for police officers to adapt to dynamic real-world situations. The dissenting opinion raises valid concerns about the potential for dilution of established constitutional protections, suggesting that without clear, pre-fixed administrative guidance for all foreseeable operational contingencies, the very purpose of such guidelines—to prevent unfettered discretion—is jeopardized, potentially opening the door for future debates on the interpretation of "substantial compliance" with administrative guidelines.
