Commonwealth v. Walker
92 A.3d 766 (2014) (2014)
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Rule of Law:
Pennsylvania law no longer imposes a per se ban on the admission of expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification. The admissibility of such testimony is now a matter left to the trial court's discretion, subject to the standard rules of evidence for expert witnesses, including relevance and the Frye test for general acceptance in the scientific community.
Facts:
- On October 15, 2005, Jenna Moreno, Courtney Howe, and Caitlyn Costello were robbed at gunpoint.
- Two days later, Moreno and Howe identified Benjamin Walker from a police photo array as the perpetrator.
- On October 28, 2005, Jonathan Ghitis and Kristina Leone were walking when a man, alleged to be Walker, and a co-conspirator robbed them at gunpoint.
- During the second robbery, the assailant threw Leone to the ground and repeatedly struck her on the head with his gun.
- Hours after the second robbery, Leone immediately identified Walker from a photo array; Ghitis also identified Walker but was less than 100% positive.
- The perpetrator and the victims in the second robbery were of different races.
- The sole evidence connecting Walker to either robbery was the eyewitness identification provided by the victims.
Procedural Posture:
- Benjamin Walker was charged in a Pennsylvania trial court with crimes related to two robberies.
- Walker filed a pre-trial motion in limine to present expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, or in the alternative, to hold a Frye hearing.
- The trial court denied the motion, citing existing precedent that categorically banned such testimony.
- A jury acquitted Walker of charges related to the first robbery but convicted him of charges related to the second robbery.
- Walker appealed his conviction to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Superior Court affirmed the judgment, stating it was bound by the Supreme Court's precedent.
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted Walker's petition for allowance of appeal to reconsider its per se ban on this type of expert testimony.
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Issue:
Is a trial court permitted, in its discretion, to allow expert testimony regarding the general reliability of eyewitness identification?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Todd
Yes. A trial court is permitted, in its discretion, to allow expert testimony regarding the general reliability of eyewitness identification. The court's previous decisions establishing a per se ban on such testimony are overruled as they are inconsistent with modern scientific understanding and the approach of the vast majority of jurisdictions. The former rationale, that such testimony invades the jury's province to determine credibility, is flawed; the expert's role is to educate the jury on general scientific principles (e.g., weapons focus, cross-racial identification, stress) that are often beyond the ken of a layperson and may be counterintuitive. This educational testimony assists the jury in making a more informed credibility assessment without opining on the truthfulness of any specific witness. The court also rejected the argument that cross-examination and closing arguments are sufficient tools to challenge eyewitness reliability, as they are less effective for explaining complex scientific concepts. Therefore, the case is remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion and reconsider the admissibility of the proffered expert testimony, which may include a Frye hearing to assess the general acceptance of the expert's methodology.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Castille
No. The court should not abandon its existing exclusion of expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification. The majority improperly accepts contested social science as settled fact without an evidentiary hearing. This decision will allow perpetrators of violent crimes to be acquitted based on the generic opinions of experts, rather than the jury's common-sense evaluation of the facts. Traditional trial methods, including vigorous cross-examination and carefully crafted jury instructions (such as a modified Kloiber charge), are sufficient to address concerns about witness reliability. The majority's new rule will create significant practical problems, including high costs for the court system and a flood of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in cases where no expert is called.
Dissenting - Justice Eakin
No. The court should maintain its prohibition on expert testimony about the reliability of other witnesses. Such testimony gives an "unwarranted appearance of authority" that impermissibly intrudes upon the jury's exclusive role as the arbiter of witness credibility. A better and more impartial course would be to enhance standard jury instructions to educate jurors about scientifically identified factors that may affect identification. Allowing a "battle of the experts" will be expensive, time-consuming, and will subject victims of crime to being discredited in open court by hired specialists whose singular purpose is to question their testimony.
Analysis:
This decision represents a significant shift in Pennsylvania evidence law, aligning the Commonwealth with the overwhelming majority of state and federal courts. By overturning the per se ban established in cases like Commonwealth v. Simmons, the court acknowledges the substantial body of scientific research questioning the reliability of eyewitness identification. This ruling empowers trial judges as gatekeepers to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether jurors require expert assistance to evaluate eyewitness testimony, which is widely recognized as a leading cause of wrongful convictions. The decision will likely increase the use of Frye hearings and alter litigation strategies in cases heavily reliant on eyewitness evidence.
